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Abstract 
Stanley Surrey, one of the most important figures in the 
history of American tax law scholarship, was a member of the 
Shoup Mission, which made a thorough recommendation on 
revising the Japanese tax system after the Second World War.  In 
the Mission, he was in charge of modernizing Japan’s tax 
administration system.  Among other things, he recommended 
implementing the Blue Return System, a set of incentives for 
taxpayers to file their tax returns based on actual data on their 
economic activities.  As is well-known in Japan, the System 
contributed significantly to the public’s acceptance of the self-
assessment approach.  However, it is less known that Stanley Surrey, 
despite his original ideas that aimed at rationalizing the tax dispute 
resolution system, happened to have a considerable influence on the 
transformation of administrative law in Japan.  This was especially 
notable on the birth of a common law doctrine with respect to the 
administrative agency’s duty to provide reasons in a wide range of 
administrative determinations.  In this article, the author points out 
the following facts.  First, in the Report of the Shoup Mission, 
Surrey proposed several measures for mitigating tax disputes 
between the government and the taxpayers.  The proposal was 
identical to one that he and Roger Traynor had previously put 
forward to improve the federal tax administration of the United 
States.  Second, Surrey suggested that the taxpayer had to be 
notified of the reason for an assessment of deficiency and that the 
more comprehensively the tax office could investigate the taxpayer, 
the more detailed reasons should be provided to him.  However, 
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Japanese lawmakers made the notification a privilege for blue 
return filers, that is, for those who filed tax returns based on data 
that recorded details of their economic activities.  Third, the 
Japanese judiciary followed the literal interpretation rule in 
reading the statutory mandate to give reasons.  Above all, the 
Supreme Court of Japan in Udono, a 1963 decision, held that an 
administrative determination sent to a taxpayer without sufficient 
reasons should be revoked.  The Court did so mainly because it 
believed that the statutory mandate to notify the taxpayer of the 
reasons embodied the spirit of due process and that to obey the 
spirit, it was inevitable to sacrifice the collection of a correct 
amount of tax in favor of ensuring the administrative agency’s 
rational decision-making. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the Meiji Restoration, American law has had an 
enormous influence on Japanese law.1   This was especially true 
during the period when the Allied Powers occupied Japan just after 
the Second World War (WWII), as American Law had 
unprecedented impacts on Japanese law and society.2  It changed the 
pattern of farmland ownership in Japan drastically. 3   It also 
introduced US-style antitrust law in Japan.4  Part of the impact of 
the policies pursued by the Allied Forces lasted long after the 
occupation was terminated. 
 
 1 See, e.g., Kenzo Takayanagi, Reception and Influence of Occidental Legal Ideas in 
Japan, in WESTERN INFLUENCES IN MODERN JAPAN: A SERIES OF PAPERS ON CULTURAL 
RELATIONS 70, 80 (Inazo Nitobe, et al., 1931) (describing that in the early years of Meiji, 
one of Japan’s main juristic sources was the US); JOHN OWEN HALEY, AUTHORITY 
WITHOUT POWER: LAW AND THE JAPANESE PARADOX 67–80 (Donald Black ed., Studies of 
Law and Social Control Ser., 1991). 
 2 See generally Thomas L. Blakemore, Post-War Developments in Japanese Law, 
1947 WIS. L. REV. 632 (1947); Alfred C. Oppler, The Reform of Japan’s Legal and 
Judicial System under Allied Occupation, 24 WASH. L. REV. & ST. B. J. 290 (1949). 
 3 See generally LAURENCE I. HEWES, JR., JAPAN: LAND AND MEN: AN ACCOUNT OF 
THE JAPANESE LAND REFORM PROGRAM, 1945–51 (1955); RONALD DORE, LAND REFORM IN 
JAPAN (1959); Mary G. McDonald, Agricultural Landholding in Japan: Fifty Years after 
Land Reform, 28 GEOFORUM 55, 58 (1997); and Toshihiko Kawagoe, Agricultural Land 
Reform in Postwar Japan: Experiences and Issues (World Bank, Policy Research Working 
Paper, No. WPS 2111, 1999),  
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/469971468771280762/Agricultural-land-
reform-in-postwar-Japan-experiences-and-issues [https://perma.cc/7FL4-NBA3]. 
 4 See generally T. A. BISSON, ZAIBATSU DISSOLUTION IN JAPAN (1954); Michiko 
Ariga & Luvern V. Rieke, The Antimonopoly Law of Japan and Its Enforcement, 39 WASH. 
L. REV. 437 (1964); Kozo Yamamura, The Development of Anti-Monopoly Policy in Japan: 
The Erosion of Japanese Anti-Monopoly, 1947–1967, 2 STUD. L. & ECON. DEV. 1 (1967); 
ELEANOR M. HADLEY, ANTITRUST IN JAPAN (1970); Note, Trustbusting in Japan: Cartels 
and Government-Business Cooperation, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1064, 1065–68 (1981). 
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The Blue Return System [aoiro shinkoku seido] is one 
example. 5   It is a policy designed to give corporations and 
individual business owners strong incentives to file their tax returns 
according to their balance sheets, profit and loss statements, and 
other documents.6  The Shoup Mission, in its 1949 Report on the 
reforms of the Japanese tax system (hereinafter the “Report”), 7 
advocated strongly in favor of the policy.8  By virtue of the policy, 
now, more than 98 percent of the active corporations and more than 
50 percent of the business owners in Japan file tax returns according 
to their books and other documents.9  This approach contributed 
 
 5 Monica Prasad, Avoiding the Aid Curse? Taxation and Development in Japan, in 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRANSNATIONAL TAX REFORM: THE SHOUP MISSION TO 
JAPAN IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT 289, 293–94 (W. Elliot Brownlee et al. eds., 2013) 
(describing positive evaluations of the Blue Return System). 
 6 Noboru Tanabe, Blue Return System in Japan, in READINGS ON INCOME TAX 
ADMINISTRATION: A COMPREHENSIVE SELECTION OF MATERIALS ON INCOME TAX 
ADMINISTRATION DRAWN FROM AROUND THE WORLD, SUPPLEMENTED BY TEXT, QUESTIONS, 
AND PROBLEMS OF THE EDITORS 221, 221–29 (Patrick L. Kelley & Oliver Oldman eds., 
1973); Hideaki Sato & Masahiro Shibuya, The Role of Tax Administration and Collection, 
in A FINAL DRAFT REPORT FROM FAIR TO THE WORLD BANK ON “TAXATION AND 
ECONOMIC GROWTH” (ASIAN MIRACLE PROJECT) 175, 181–83 (Foundation for Advanced 
Information and Research, 1993); Justin Dabner, Japan’s Income Tax System: Lessons for 
Australia, 11 REVENUE L. J. 1, 9–11 (2001). 
 7 GEN. HEADQUARTER SUP. COMMAND. ALLIED POWERS, REPORT ON JAPANESE 
TAXATION BY THE SHOUP MISSION VOLUME I AND IV, 
http://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/10288496 (last visited Nov. 11, 2019) 
[https://perma.cc/2GWS-TVT8] [hereinafter Report]. 
 8 For an overview of the Shoup Mission written in English, see generally Carl S. 
Shoup, The Tax Mission to Japan, 1949–50, in TAX REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
177 (Malcolm Gillis ed., 1989); HIROSHI KANEKO, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE JAPANESE 
TAX SYSTEM AFTER WORLD WAR II, in A FINAL DRAFT REPORT FROM FAIR TO THE WORLD 
BANK ON “TAXATION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH” (ASIAN MIRACLE PROJECT) 7, 13–18 
(Foundation for Advanced Information and Research, Japan, 1993). For a thorough and 
highly valuable analysis of the Shoup Mission, see generally W. Elliot Brownlee, The 
American Occupation of Japan, the Shoup Mission, and the Transfer of Tax Ideas, 1945–
1952, in GLOBAl DEBATES ABOUT TAXATION 158 (Holger Nehring & Florian Schui eds., 
2007); W. Elliot Brownlee, The Shoup Mission to Japan: Two Political Economies 
Intersect, in THE NEW FISCAL SOCIOLOGY: TAXATION IN COMPARATIVE AND HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 237 (Isaac William Martin et al. eds., 2009); W. Elliot Brownlee, Shoup vs. 
Dodge: Conflict over Tax Reform in Japan, 1947–1951, 47 KEIO ECON. STUD. 91 (2011); 
W. ELLIOT BROWNLEE ET AL., THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TRANSNATIONAL TAX REFORM: 
THE SHOUP MISSION TO JAPAN IN HISTORICAL CONTEXt (2013). See also Vicki L. Beyer, 
The Legacy of the Shoup Mission: Taxation Inequities and Tax Reform in Japan, 10 UCLA 
PAC. BASIN L. J. 388 (1992). 
 9 Masahiko Hino, Aoiro shinkoku seido no igi to kongo no arikata [The Blue Return 
System’s Significance and Its Future], 60 Zeimu daigakko ronso 315, 344–47 (2009). 
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significantly to the improvement of the tax administration system in 
postwar Japan.10 
The influence of the Blue Return System is not limited to 
income tax.  Since its inception, the system has had a considerable 
impact on the development of administrative law in Japan.11  One of 
the privileges available for blue return filers substantially 
contributed to the emergence of an important doctrine in 
administrative law.  A blue return filer who keeps books and records 
of his commercial activities and files tax returns supported by them 
with official authorization for doing so, enjoys the privilege of being 
informed of the reasons when the tax authorities try to assess a 
deficiency12 in his tax liability.13  In the first two decades after the 
WWII, the Supreme Court of Japan interpreted the requirement 
literally. 14   In several decisions, it revoked assessments when 
reasons were not expressed concretely in the letter of assessment.15  
 
 10 For an overview of the Japanese tax system written in English, see generally e.g., 
Hiroshi Kaneko, Japan: An Overview of Current Taxation Issues, 14 INTERTAX 32 (1986); 
HIROMITSU ISHI, THE JAPANESE TAX SYSTEM (3rd ed. 2001). For an introduction to 
Japanese tax administration, see generally Koji Ishimura, Japanese Tax Litigation System 
and Procedures, 13 LAW JAPAN 111 (1980); SATO & SHIBUYA, supra note 6; Vicki Beyer, 
Tax Administration in Japan, 4 REVENUE L. J. 144 (1994). 
 11 See, e.g., Hiroshi Kaneko, Rule of Law and Japanese Tax Law 21–24 (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author), https://jtri.or.jp/assets/pdf/about/information03.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/73JF-EZH2] (discussing the improvement of tax procedures). 
 12 Unlike the US income tax, there is no notice of deficiency in the Japanese tax 
system. If the Head of Tax Office finds deficiency in a taxpayer’s tax return, he 
immediately makes an assessment [kōsei]. See Kokuzei tsūsoku hō [Act Regarding 
General Rules for National Taxes], Law No. 66 of 1962, art. 24 (Japan). In practice, 
however, the officer would first try to persuade the taxpayer to revise the tax return and 
make an assessment only after he failed to persuade the taxpayer. The assessment is 
generally deemed to be an example of the administrative dispositions [gyōsei shobun] or 
the administrative acts [gyōsei kōi]. For the meaning of these two concepts, see e.g., 
Robert W. Dziubla, The Impotent Sword of Japanese Justice: The Doctrine of Shobunsei as 
a Barrier to Administrative Litigation, 18 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 37, 37–38 (1985). The 
Report uses the term “reassessment” instead of “assessment” presumably because, in the 
Report, an assessment refers to the taxpayer’s act of filing tax return. See REPORT, supra 
note 7, at 217–20. 
 13 See Shotoku zei hō [Income Tax Act], Law No. 33 of 1965, art. 155, ¶ 2 (Japan) 
(providing that the Head of Tax Office should describe the reasons of assessment in the 
letter of assessment); Hōjin zei hō [Corporate Tax Act], Law No. 34 of 1965, art. 130, ¶ 2 
(Japan). See also DABNER, supra note 6, at 10; KANEKO, supra note 11, at 21–22. 
 14 KANEKO, supra note 11, at 22. 
 15 See generally Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] May 31, 1963, Sho 36 (o) no. 84, 17 
SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 617 (Japan); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] 
Dec. 27, 1963, Sho 37 (o) no. 1015, 17 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
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In these cases, the tax authorities were unable to make another 
assessment for the taxable year because of the statute of limitations.  
In essence, the Court prohibited the tax authorities from collecting 
the correct amount of taxes from taxpayers in order to support their 
privilege.16 
Although the key legal issues in these cases centered on the 
interpretation of some particular provisions in the tax statutes, the 
Court implied that its decision was derived from a general principle 
of administrative law.  In Udono v. Tokyo kokuzeikyoku cho in 1963, 
the leading case on this matter, the Court presented the following 
broad statement: 
In general, when a statute requires giving reasons in 
administrative disposition [gyosei shobun], it does so 
in order to ensure that administrative agencies make 
careful and reasonable decisions and hence to avoid 
their arbitrariness on one hand, and to benefit the 
private parties in taking an appeal by informing them 
the reasons for the decision on the other hand.  
Therefore, when an administrative agency fails to 
note down the reasons for a decision, the decision 
itself should be revoked.  The extent of reasons to be 
given is determined with reference to the nature of 
the disposition on one hand and the aim and purpose 
of each provision in a statute that demands giving 
reasons on the other hand.17 
Furthermore, it reiterated what it held in the context of tax-
related matters in non-tax cases.  It followed Udono entirely in the 
 
1871 (Japan); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 25, 1974, Sho 45 (gyō tsu) no. 36, 28 SAIKŌ 
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 405 (Japan). 
 16 To compare with the state of affairs in the United States, see INTERNAL REVENUE 
CODE § 7522(a) (1990) (providing that “an inadequate description” in a notice “shall not 
invalidate such notice”) [hereinafter I.R.C.]. See also Michael Salzman & Leslie Book, IRS 
Practice and Procedure, §10.03 [3][b] (description of the case law on the validity of a 
notice). 
 17 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] May 31, 1963, Sho 36 (o) no. 84, 17 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO 
MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 617, 620 (Japan). In Japan, a “revocable” administrative 
disposition can be revoked not only by the administrative agency itself but also by the 
courts. For the meaning of “revocable” administrative disposition in the tax contexts, see 
Michael Matsukawa, Administrative Appeals from Tax Dispositions, 16 LAW IN JAPAN 91, 
92 (1983). 
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decision on a case in which a woman was suspected of a 
relationship with the Japanese Red Army and was denied a passport 
when she applied for it.18  Citing Udono, the Court revoked the 
Foreign Minister’s decision not to issue her a passport.  Thus, the 
Court established a common law doctrine: the lack of sufficient 
reasons for an administrative disposition when a statute requires 
giving reasons in administrative dispositions makes such a 
disposition revocable. 
In 1993, the Diet of Japan enacted the Administrative 
Procedure Act (APA). 19   The APA includes two provisions on 
giving reasons in making adverse dispositions.20  It made giving 
reasons mandatory across the board for two broad categories of 
administrative dispositions.  Although the provisions were 
apparently consistent with the existing common law doctrine on 
giving reasons, it was not clear whether the doctrine survived under 
the new act.21  In 2011, the Supreme Court, in the decision on a case 
later known as the First-Class Architect case, held that it certainly 
survives.22  In this case, without citing Udono, the Court found that 
 
 18 See generally Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 22, 1985, Sho 57 (gyō tsu) no. 70, 39 
SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1 (Japan). 
 19 See generally Gyōsei tetsuzuki hō [Administrative Procedure Act], Law No. 88 of 
1993 (Japan). For an English translation of the act, see Mark A. Levin, Administrative 
Procedure Law (Japan), 3 APLPJ 182 (2002). See also Lorenz Kodderitzsch, Japan’s New 
Administrative Procedure Law: Reasons for Its Enactment and Likely Implications, 24 
LAW JAPAN 105, 115–129 (1991) (providing an overview of the act); Takehisa Nakagawa, 
Administrative Informality in Japan: Governmental Activities Outside Statutory 
Authorization, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 175, 181–82 (2000); Katsuya Uga, Development of the 
Concepts of Transparency and Accountability in Japanese Administrative Law, in LAW IN 
JAPAN: A TURNING POINT 276 (Daniel H. Foote ed., 2008) (describing the contents and 
legislative history of the act); Tom Ginsburg, The Politics of Transparency in Japanese 
Administrative Law, in LAW IN JAPAN: A TURNING POINT 233, 304 (analyzing policy 
implication of the act). 
 20 Gyōsei tetsuzuki hō [Administrative Procedure Act], Law No. 88 of 1993, art. 8 
(Japan) (discussing reasons in turning down of applications [shinsei]) & art.14 (discussing 
reasons in making adverse dispositions [furieki shobun]). 
 21 Some commentators claimed that the common law would not survive because it 
had deemed the failure to give reasons to be one of the defects or errors [kashi] in an 
administrative disposition whereas the new act embodied the idea of procedural due 
process. See e.g., Kazuaki Nishitoba, Riyu fuki hanrei hori to gyosei tetsuzuki ho no riyu 
teiji-1, 112 MINSHOHO ZASSHI 851(1995); Kazuaki Nishitoba, Riyu fuki hanrei hori to 
gyosei tetsuzuki ho no riyu teiji-2, 113 MINSHOHO ZASSHI 1 (1995). 
 22 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 7, 2011, Hei 21 (gyō hi) no. 91, 65 SAIKŌ 
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 2081 (Japan) (X1 v. Kuni [The Government]), 
available at http://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=1110 [https://perma.cc/87K9-
UK7S] [hereinafter First-Class Architect Case]. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2019
2020] U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. 179 
the spirit of Article 14 of the APA was the same as that of the 
common law doctrine.  It revoked the decision by the Minister of 
Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism because he had failed 
to record sufficient reasons for his decision in the notification letter. 
In sum, the Blue Return System had given birth to a firmly 
established common law doctrine on giving reasons in Japan. 
Until now, however, nobody has ever tried to find out the 
true origin of the doctrine. 23   Rather, it is vaguely but widely 
believed in Japan that the doctrine is derived from the principle of 
due process of law, which is most famously embodied in the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
Constitution of the United States.24 
In this article, I will point out the following facts.  First, 
Stanley S. Surrey, one of the most important scholars in the field of 
U.S. tax law, was the central figure in drafting the part of the Report 
of the Shoup Mission on the administration of Japanese income 
tax.25  Second, the arguments on the tax administration in the Report 
bear a remarkable resemblance to the proposal for the reform of the 
U.S. federal tax administration system, which Surrey submitted in 
the late 1930s in collaboration with Roger J. Traynor, another 
important figure in the history of tax law.26  At that time, they tried 
hard to dissolve the serious congestion in the process of tax appeals.  
Their proposal aimed at encouraging taxpayers to submit, as early as 
possible, all the necessary information to determine their tax 
 
 23 Professor Shusaku Kitajima (Tohoku University) has written insightful articles on 
the development the doctrine. See Shusaku Kitajima, Riyu teiji no teido to shobun kijun, 
373 HOGAKU KYOSHITSU 49 (2011); Shusaku Kitajima, Riyu teiji hori no keisei to hatten, 
58 (1-SUP.) SHOMU GEPPO 160 (2012); Shusaku Kitajima, Gyosei tetsuzuki ho rippo katei 
no okeru riyu teiji kitei, 59 (1-SUP.) SHOMU GEPPO 126 (2013); Shusaku Kitajima, Gyosei 
tetsuzuki ho seitei go no riyu teiji, 60 (1-SUP.) SHOMU GEPPO 105 (2014); Shusaku Kitajima, 
Ippan ho to shiteno gyosei tetsuzuki ho no kaishaku ni tsuite, 79 HOGAKU 133 (2015). But, 
as of now, he has not yet written about the origin of the doctrine. 
 24 See, e.g., KANEKO, supra note 11, 21–24 (noting that the requirement that the 
government explain the reasons for any reassessment is derived from the principle of due 
process of law). See also Hiroshi Shiono, Gyosei shobun to riyu no fuki [Administrative 
Dispositions and Giving Reasons], 1(3) JICHI JITSUMU SEMINA 36 (1962) (referring to the 
Administrative Procedure Act of the United States and article 31 of the Constitution of 
Japan (due process of law in criminal procedure) in contemplating whether the 
administrative agency should explain the reasons for administrative dispositions). But see 
NISHITOBA, supra note 21 (claiming that the common law doctrine did not stem from the 
principle of due process, whereas the Administrative Procedure Act of Japan does). 
 25 Stanley S. Surrey was a former Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and a 
specialist of taxation. 
 26 See infra text accompanying note 104 (providing a biography for Roger J. Traynor). 
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liability.  They argued that if taxpayers disclosed the information on 
their economic affairs in the earlier stages of tax administration, the 
number of tax controversies would be smaller because the tax 
authorities would no longer have to send several notices of 
deficiency without firm foundations.  By comparing the Report with 
the articles written by Traynor and Surrey, we now have a better 
understanding of the original intent of Surrey’s proposal in the 
Report.  The goal of his proposal was to provide the most cost-
effective approach toward assessing and collecting income tax. 
The original intent, thus found, will be contrasted with the 
development of the common law doctrine on giving reasons.  While 
the doctrine has its origins in the Blue Return System proposed by 
Surrey, the development of the doctrine has by no means been 
consistent with his original intent. 
This article is the first attempt ever to draw attention to this 
inconsistency.  It is also the first study on the Blue Return System 
and the common law doctrine that originated from the system 
through the academic works of Stanley Surrey.  In the past, neither 
administrative law scholars nor taxation law scholars, in the U.S. or 
in Japan, has tried to trace the origins of the system and the genesis 
of the doctrine. 
To be sure, we already have very good analyses of the 
influence of American lawyers and other foreign professionals on 
Japanese administrative law in the period of occupation.  Alfred 
Oppler, a German jurist and one of the members of the Supreme 
Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), looked back on the era 
nearly 30 years later.27  John Haley, a specialist in Japanese law, 
focused on the significance of the reform in administrative law and 
analyzed the factors that blocked the reform, through research that 
was partly based on Oppler’s memoirs.28  We also have Shin’ichi 
Takayanagi’s articles in Japanese on the transformation of the 
administrative litigation system in Japan under occupation.29 
 
 27 ALFRED CHRISTIAN OPPLER, LEGAL REFORM IN OCCUPIED JAPAN: A PARTICIPANT 
LOOKS BACK 8 (1976). 
 28 John O. Haley, Toward a Reappraisal of the Occupation Legal Reforms: 
Administrative Accountability, in EIBEIHO RONSHU: TANAKA HIDEO SENSEI KANREKI KINEN 
543 (Koichiro Fujikura ed., 1987). See also John O. Haley, Japanese Administrative Law, 
19 L. JAPAN 1 (1986) (providing an overview of the administrative law development in 
post-war Japan). 
 29 Shin’ichi Takayanagi, Gyosei sosho hosei no kaikaku [Reforms on the 
Administrative Litigation], 4 SENGO KAIKAKU [THE POSTWAR REFORMS] 291 (Tokyo 
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More recently, scholars of economic history both in the U.S. 
and in Japan published a book of excellent articles on the Shoup 
Mission and its influence on the Japanese tax system.30  However, 
the articles in the book refer to Stanley Surrey only on limited 
occasions, presumably because they focus on the personal history of 
Carl Shoup, the head of the Mission.  Although one of the articles 
carefully analyzes the key to the success of the Blue Return System, 
it does not engage with the common law doctrine on giving 
reasons.31 
Even in Japan, nobody has ever tried to find out the effect of 
the Report by the Shoup Mission on administrative law in postwar 
Japan.  Though the fact that the cases on the blue returns has created 
a common law doctrine on giving reasons is widely known, all 
comprehensive studies on the doctrine of giving reasons in 
administrative law in general, for some reason, have chosen 
jurisdictions other than the U.S. as a point of reference.32  Scholars 
of law in the U.S. generally ignore the Japanese doctrine on giving 
reasons probably because they do not find any counterpart in the 
American law, where they deal not just with notice but also with 
notice and hearings in general.33 
 
daigaku shakai kagaku kenkyujo sengo kaikaku kenkyu kai ed., 1975); Shin’ichi 
Takayanagi, Gyosei kokka sei yori shiho kokka sei he [From an Administrative State 
System to a Judicial State System], 2 KOHO NO RIRON TANAKA JIRO SENSEI KOKI KINEN GE 
2193 (Ichiro Ogawa ed., 1977); Shin’ichi Takayanagi, Sengo shoki no gyosei soshoho 
kaikaku ron [The Discourses on the Reform of Administrative Litigation System in the 
Early Postwar Era], 31 SHAKAI KAGAKU KENKYU 1 (1979). Narufumi Kadomatsu regards 
Takayanagi’s trilogy as indispensable in studying the postwar judicial reforms. Narufumi 
Kadomatsu, Gyosei ho tono kankei: Gyosei sosho seido wo megutte, 612 HOGAKU SEMINA 
33, 37 (2005). 
 30 See generally BROWNLEE ET AL., supra note 8 (providing an overview of the Shoup 
Mission in English). 
 31 PRASAD, supra note 5, at 293–97. 
 32 See, e.g., Shigeki Kubo, Furansu ni okeru gyosei koi no riyu fuki-1 [Giving 
Reasons to the Administrative Dispositions in France], 87 MINSHOHO ZASSHI 703 (1983); 
Shigeki Kubo, Furansu ni okeru gyosei koi no riyu fuki-2 [Giving Reasons to the 
Administrative Dispositions in France], 87 MINSHOHO ZASSHI 855 (1983) (a comparative 
study of Japanese law and French law); HISASHI KOKETSU, SHOBUN RIYU TO TORIKESHI 
SOSHO [THE REASONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE DISPOSITIONS AND THE LITIGATION FOR THE 
REVOCATION] (2000) (a comparative study of Japanese law and French law); Mamoru Suda, 
Riyu teiji to shobun riyu [Giving Reasons and the Reasons for the Administrative 
Disposition], 179 HOGAKU RONSO 1 (2016) (a comparative study of Japanese law and 
German law). 
 33 See generally Nobushige Ukai & Nathaniel L. Nathanson, Protection of Property 
Rights and Due Process of Law in the Japanese Constitution, 43 WASH. L. REV. 1129 
(1968) (describing due process in Japanese property law with no analysis on giving 
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This study is the first attempt to investigate the link between 
the philosophy of American tax lawyers and the development of the 
administrative law doctrine in Japan.  In doing so, the author fills 
the massive void left by the preceding studies. 
The works of Traynor and Surrey give us important 
implications on Japanese law and American law.  The essence of 
their arguments is that the procedural safeguards including giving 
reasons are not worthwhile but are just a means to the end that 
everyone pays one’s fair share.  They place very little or no value on 
giving reasons or, more generally, notice and hearing.  For Japanese 
law, their idea is contrasted with the orthodox understanding of 
giving reasons, according to which they embody the procedural 
rights of the people.  For American law, their ideas may be 
compared with the Supreme Court’s doctrine of reasoned 
explanation.34  The Court applies the doctrine to all agency actions 
including rulemaking and adjudication.35  However, Traynor and 
Surrey suggested that we might need different rationales for 
rulemaking and adjudication in requiring reasoned explanations.  
Their idea may have an effect on considering the issue of whether 
the doctrine of reasoned explanation is applicable to a notice of 
deficiency in the context of federal taxation.36 
The rest of this article proceeds as follows.  In Part I, I 
present what Stanley Surrey proposed in the Report of the Shoup 
Mission.  I also briefly describe the Blue Return System and 
compare it with the Report in this part.  It will then become clear 
that the Report supplied an integral component of the Blue Return 
 
reasons); Nathaniel L. Nathanson & Yasuhiro Fujita, The Right to Fair Hearing in 
Japanese Administrative Law, 45 WASH. L. REV. 273 (1970) (analyzing hearing right 
without mentioning giving reasons); John K. M. Ohnesorge, Western Administrative Law 
in Northeast Asia: A Comparativist’s History (June, 2002) (unpublished S.J.D. dissertation, 
Harvard Law School) (on file with author’s publication page on Wisconsin-Madison Law 
School website), https://media.law.wisc.edu/m/ngvjn/all.pdf. [https://perma.cc/D6QY-
GTN5] (discussing comparative administration law with no analysis on giving reasons). 
 34 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 417–19 (1972); 
Motor Vehicle Mfr. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42–46 (1983). 
 35 Id. 
 36 See QinetiQ US Holdings, Inc. & Subsidiaries v. Commissioner, 845 F.3d 555 (4th 
Cir. 2017) (holding that IRS’s notice of deficiency is not subject to Administrative 
Procedure Act’s general requirement of reasoned explanation for final agency decision). 
See also Patrick J. Smith, The APA’s Reasoned-Explanation Rule and IRS Deficiency 
Notices, 134 TAX NOTES 331, 341–44 (2012) (insisting on the application of the rule to 
notices of deficiency); Steve R. Johnson, Reasoned Explanation and IRS Adjudication, 63 
DUKE L.J. 1771, 1793–95 (2014) (claiming that application is not advisable). 
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System but there is a considerable difference between the Report 
and the system.  Among other things, the requirement of giving 
reasons in an assessment became applicable only to the blue return 
filers, despite Surrey’s original proposal in the Report, in which the 
requirement was across the board.  In Part II, I present what Traynor 
and Surrey proposed in the Traynor Plan, which sought to relieve 
the serious congestion in tax administration.  The contemporary 
debates over the plan are also introduced in brief.  I then contrast the 
plan with the Report to show that the Report is heavily indebted to 
the Traynor Plan.  In Part III, we return to Japan and see how case 
law on the requirement of giving reasons has developed.  We will 
learn that the judiciary, including the Supreme Court, has 
interpreted the requirement of providing reasons quite literally and 
that the procedural rights of taxpayers was respected significantly in 
this regard.  I will examine what made the judiciary choose this 
interpretation.  I also analyze why Surrey’s original ideas did not 
survive in the administration of the Blue Return System.  In 
conclusion, I locate our discussion in a broader context. 
II. SURREY’S PROPOSAL IN THE REPORT OF THE 
SHOUP MISSION 
In this part, I introduce the Shoup Mission briefly and 
explain the circumstances under which the Mission was organized. 
Then, I present Surrey’s proposal in the Report including the Blue 
Return System. 
A. The Shoup Mission 
In 1945, soon after the WWII, General Douglas MacArthur, 
the SCAP, ordered his personnel to start the first attempt at tax 
reforms in Japan.37  The central component of this project was the 
“Extraordinary Tax Program,” the purpose of which was “to level 
off excessive concentrations of private wealth.”38  The program was 
composed of a couple of one-time levies, the capital levy [zaisan 
zei], and the war indemnity special tax [senji hosho tokubetsu zei], 
 
 37 See Henry Shavell, Postwar Taxation in Japan, 56 J. POL. ECON. 124, 130–34 
(1948) (introducing Japan’s postwar tax development); Henry Shavell, Taxation Reform in 
Occupied Japan, 1 NAT’L TAX J. 127, 131–34 (1948) (introducing Japan’s tax reforms). 
 38 SHAVELL, supra note 37, at 132 (explaining Taxation Reform in Occupied Japan). 
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which was implemented in 1946.39  Despite its appearance as a tax 
measure, it was in essence a confiscation of the economic value that 
was acquired through the war.  Thereafter, the members of the 
project began to change the general framework of the Japanese 
income tax system.  As part of this general tax reform, they 
proposed a self-assessment system instead of the traditional 
government assessment.  Self-assessment was introduced by the 
newly enacted Income Tax Act of 1947.40  However, the results 
were disastrous.41  The government revealed its goal of tax revenue 
and allotted the amount to the regional tax bureaus and tax offices.  
Each tax office had to levy tax on the relatively affluent taxpayers in 
its district in order to collect the allotted tax revenue.  Tax officials 
were forced to make assessments in many cases without reasonable 
grounds and, quite reasonably, the taxpayers gave rise to a flood of 
complaints. 
It was around this time that MacArthur had asked L. Harold 
Moss, an able tax official who was working for the US Army in 
South Korea at that time, to join his team.42  Moss arrived in Japan 
in April 1948. 43   With his help, General Douglas MacArthur 
decided to start a more thorough reform of the tax system in Japan.44  
Moss proposed that “a special mission of outstanding tax 
economists” should “conduct a comprehensive survey of the 
 
 39 See generally Zaisan zei hō [Capital Levy Act], Law No. 52 of 1946 (Japan); Senji 
hōsho tokubetsu sochi hō [Act on War Indemnity Special Measures], Law No. 38 of 1946 
(Japan). 
 40 Shotoku zei hō [Income Tax Act], Law No. 27 of 1947, art. 26 (Japan); SHAVELL, 
supra note 37 (Postwar Taxation), at 134. For the definition and the characteristics of self-
assessment, see KELLY & OLDMAN, supra note 6, at 203–20; Alan D. Liker, The Legal and 
Institutional Framework of Tax Administration in Developing Countries, 14 UCLA L. REV. 
240, 252–62 (1966). 
 41 KEIICHIRO HIRATA ET AL., SHOWA ZEISEI NO KAIKO TO TEMBO (I), 291–351(1979); 
PRASAD, supra note 5, at 294–96 (describing the breakdown of Japanese tax administration 
in 1949). 
 42 For the background of Moss, see W. Elliot Brownlee & Eisaku Ide, Shoup and the 
Japan Mission: Organizing for Investigation, in BROWNLEE, ET AL. (eds) supra note 8, at 
195–98 (introducing Moss’s background). For a more comprehensive analysis of the role 
Moss played in the reform of tax administration in Japan, see Shunichiro Koyanagi, Sengo 
zeimu gyosei no keisei to GHQ: Harold Moss shi no kouken [The Creation of Post-War 
Tax Administration and GHQ: The Contribution of Harold Moss], in SEIICHI MORI, HO 
BUNKA TOSHITENO SOZEI 111 (2015). 
 43 HIRATA ET AL., supra note 41, at 336; KOYANAGI, supra note 42, at 124. 
 44 Carl S. Shoup, The Tax Mission to Japan: 1949–50, in TAX REFORM IN 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 177 (Malcolm Gillis ed., 1989). 
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national and local tax laws” and make a recommendation based on 
the survey.45 
The Shoup Mission, the core of MacArthur’s project 
comprised seven members.46  First, Moss asked Carl S. Shoup to 
become the leader of the mission.47  Then, Shoup chose six other 
members, where there were four economists including Shoup 
himself (Carl S. Shoup, Howard R. Bowen, William S. Vickrey, and 
Jerome B. Cohen), two law professors (William C. Warren and 
Stanley S. Surrey), and one state tax official at Minnesota (Rolland 
F. Hatfield).48  Some of them arrived in Japan on May 10, 1949.  
The others, including Surrey, arrived soon thereafter.  Surrey, born 
on October 3, 1910, was 38 years old at that time, and had been a 
professor of jurisprudence at the University of California at 
Berkeley for just two years.49  On May 30, Shoup announced how 
he would allocate the work among the members.50  According to 
Shoup’s plan, Surrey was in charge of “disposition of appeals and 
matters on litigation.”51  The members first interviewed the people 
in various social groups in Japan, and then prepared the drafts of the 
Report in Karuizawa, Nagano.  On August 26, 1949, the digest of 
the Report was made public.52  The main text of the Report was 
published on September 15 and the Appendix was disclosed on 
October 3.  On September 18, General MacArthur wrote a letter to 
Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida urging prompt action upon the 
contents of the Report.53  Thus, the Report was supposed to be of 
great importance to the implementation of tax reforms in Japan. 
 
 45 BROWNLEE & IDE, supra note 42, at 198. 
 46 OKURASHO ZAISEI SHI SHITSU [MINISTRY OF FINANCE, PUBLIC FINANCE HISTORY 
OFFICE] (ED.), SHOWA ZAISEI SHI: SHUSEN KARA KOWA MADE [A HISTORY OF PUBLIC 
FINANCE IN THE SHOWA ERA: FROM THE END OF THE WAR TO THE PEACE TREATY] 429–46 
(1977). For an extensive analysis of the Mission, see generally BROWNLEE ET AL., supra 
note 8. 
 47 BROWNLEE & IDE, supra note 42, at 198–201. OKURASHO ZAISEI SHI SHITSU, supra 
note 46, at 370. 
 48 BROWNLEE & IDE, supra note 42, at 201–09. 
 49 For a memoir by Surrey himself, see STANLEY S. SURREY, THE ADVISORY TAX 
MISSION TO JAPAN, in FINANCIAL EXECUTIVES INSTITUTE, ECONOMIC AND TAX 
DEVELOPMENTS OF SIGNIFICANCE TO CONTROLLERS 19, 19–21 (1949). 
 50 OKURASHO ZAISEI SHI SHITSU, supra note 46, at 442. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. at 648–59 (providing a Japanese version of Shoup’s comment). See generally 
Yomiuri Shimbun, Yomidas Rekishikan, TŌKYŌ : YOMIURI SHINBUNSHA, Aug. 27, 1949, 
Morning Ed., at 1. 
 53 Jerome B. Cohen, Tax Reform in Japan, 18 FAR EASTERN SURVEY 307, 307 (1949). 
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B. Surrey’s Proposal 
Chapter 14 of the Report, titled “Compliance, Enforcement, 
and Appeal under the Income Taxes,” is dedicated to proposals to 
improve the tax administration in Japan.  Appendix D of the Report, 
titled “Administration of the Individual and Corporate Income 
Taxes,” supplements these proposals.  Though the Report does not 
make the author of each part public, it is strongly inferred from 
Shoup’s announcement dated on May 30, 1949 that Stanley Surrey 
was the author of these parts.54 
Chapter 14 comprised 14 sections.  Appendix D was divided 
into six sections, under which there are 27 subsections.  Although 
the proposals include secondary matters such as scholarly interest in 
taxation, most of them are concerned with one of two issues, namely 
the increased role of taxpayers and improvements in the machinery 
of tax authorities. 55   Hereinafter, I will show you what Surrey 
asserted on both points. 
1. The Taxpayers’ Role 
Until around the time the Mission arrived in Japan, the role 
taxpayers played in tax administration was rather limited.  They 
were supposed to play an important role per the law, but in practice, 
they did not.  Even under the system of assessment by the 
government until 1946, a taxpayer was obliged to notify the tax 
office of the amount of income for each type of income. 56 
Nevertheless, taxpayers had very little incentive to file returns with 
the correct amount of income because the authority of the tax 
officials in the examination of the amount of income was extremely 
restricted, as we will explain in the next subsection.57  Under the 
newly introduced self-assessment system, there still seemed to be 
little incentive on part of the taxpayers to file returns with the 
correct amount of tax because the number of tax officials was small 
 
 54 See text accompanying supra note 46. 
 55 REPORT, supra note 7, at 226–27. 
 56 See, e.g., Shotoku zei hō [Income Tax Act], Law No. 24 of 1940, art. 34 (Japan) 
(stipulating the obligation of individual taxpayers to file the amount of income); Hōjin zei 
hō [Corporate Income Tax Act], Law No. 25 of 1940, art. 18 (Japan) (stipulating that a 
corporation has duty to file the amount of income and the amount of capital, as well as its 
balance sheet, profit and loss statement, etc.). 
 57 See infra text accompanying notes 64–74. 
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on the one hand and the tax offices made reassessments without 
reasonable foundations to reach the goal of tax revenue on the 
other.58  The following proposal on the taxpayers’ role by Surrey 
appeared against this backdrop. 
Surrey asserted, in the appendix of the Report, that “the 
proper measure of [income] tax is  . . .  the actual income of the 
particular taxpayer.”59  It is self-evident, but it is worth emphasizing 
further because until then, the calculation of income tax relied 
heavily on various kinds of standards. 60   To accomplish the 
computation of the actual income, taxpayers had to take part in the 
tax administration process themselves. 
Successful income tax administration rests 
essentially on voluntary compliance by the taxpayer.  
He is the person best informed as to his taxable status, 
as to the amount of his income.  The necessary 
voluntary submission of the data required to measure 
a taxpayer’s income is called self-assessment.  In 
areas where withholding does not operate, such self-
assessment is vital to satisfactory tax administration.  
The business man, the farmer, the higher salaried 
employee, the corporation—in short, all taxpayers 
require to file returns are through self-assessment 
reporting to their Government the amount of their 
incomes.  On each such person so reporting falls a 
share of the administrative task facing the nation.  
The great majority of such taxpayers must 
voluntarily perform their proper share of that task if 
tax administration is to succeed.61 
“[P]roper taxpayer compliance under a self-assessment 
system is possible only if the taxpayer keeps accurate books and 
records whereby he may ascertain his income.”62   To break the 
vicious circle in which taxpayers benefited from keeping no or 
 
 58 See KEIICHIRO HIRATA ET AL, supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
 59 REPORT, supra note 7, at Appendix D 3–4. 
 60 Id. at 212–14. 
 61 Id. at Appendix D 4–5. 
 62 Id. at Appendix D 56. 
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fictitious records, Surrey proposed providing rewards for taxpayers 
who kept records. This is the Blue Return System. 
Rewards must be sought which will positively 
encourage the taxpayer to use these tools.  One 
possibility is to provide special administrative 
treatment to a taxpayer who keeps books and records.  
Thus, a taxpayer desiring such special treatment 
would register with the Tax Office his willingness to 
keep accurate books and records.  Such books would 
be kept on a form approved by the Tax Office; it 
would be one of the various forms developed as 
indicated above.  A taxpayer so keeping books and 
records would be permitted to file his return on a 
different colored form so as to differentiate him from 
other taxpayers.  The Tax Office would assure such 
taxpayer that if he keeps such books and records and 
files his tax return on the special form he will not be 
subject to reassessment until after an actual field 
investigation is made of his income for the year.  
And if a reassessment is made, the specific reasons 
therefor must be given. 
A taxpayer not keeping such books and records 
would, on the other hand, not be guaranteed an 
investigation before reassessment but would be 
subject to reassessment by the use of standards.  
Moreover, such latter taxpayer would not be 
permitted to take an appeal to the Regional Bureau.63 
As the quote indicates, Surrey enumerated a couple of 
procedural privileges to be awarded to blue return filers.  A blue 
return filer would be reassessed only if tax officials investigated his 
books and records and found a precise amount of deficiency.  
Further, tax officials had to give him specific reasons for the 
reassessment while informing him of it.  These privileges are two 
sides of the same coin. If tax officials find a deficiency of tax from 
an investigation into a taxpayer’s books and records and make a 
 
 63 Id. at Appendix D 58. 
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reassessment based on this fact, it would be fairly easy for them to 
notify the taxpayer of the reasons for the reassessment. 
2. Allowing the Tax Officials More Power 
In Japan, the power of income tax officials over taxpayers 
was severely limited.  When the Income Tax Act of 187764 was 
being deliberated upon in the Senate [Genroin],65 the Senate deleted 
an article in the draft that authorized the tax officials to enjoy the 
power to investigate.66  Until 1940, the income tax acts stipulated 
only the power of inquiry and did not allow them to conduct 
investigations.67   The Income Tax Act of 1940, granted the tax 
officials the power to investigate “books and other materials 
regarding the [taxpayer’s] business” for the first time.68  The act 
also stipulated that a fine would be imposed on taxpayers who either 
rejected or disturbed the investigations.69  After WWII, the Capital 
Levy Act of 1946 introduced a maximum sentence of one year’s 
imprisonment for any obstruction of inquiries and investigations.70  
This was the first time a tax statute had employed imprisonment as a 
means to secure the compliance of taxpayers.  The Income Tax Act 
of 1947 followed suit.  Like the preceding income tax acts, it gave 
tax officials powers of inquiry and investigation.71  It prescribed that 
those who obstructed or did not cooperate with inquiries or 
investigations would be punished with a fine or imprisonment.72 
In reality, under the Income Tax Act of 1947, the powers of 
inquiry and investigations of the tax officials were not exercised 
appropriately. 73   Surrey summarized the state of affairs in the 
following words: 
 
 64 See generally Shotoku zei hō [Income Tax Act], Imperial Order No. 5 of 1877 
(Japan). It was the first income tax legislation. 
 65 Genroin was the only quasi-legislative body present in those times. EDWIN O. 
REISCHAUER ET AL. (eds.), JAPAN: AN ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA 450 (1993). 
 66 See generally JAPAN GENRŌIN, GENROIN KAIGI HIKKI [THE TRANSCRIPTS OF THE 
SENATE DEBATE], KOKI DAI 26 KAN 151 (Meiji hosei keizai shi kenkyujo ed.,1982). 
 67 See, e.g., HIROSHI FUJISAWA, DAI SAN SHU SHOTOKU ZEI HO CHUKAI, 126–29 (1921) 
(arguing for effective measures for encouraging proper tax returns). 
 68 Shotoku zei hō [Income Tax Act], Law No. 24 of 1940, art. 81 (Japan). 
 69 Id. at art. 92. 
 70 Zaisan zei hō [Capital Levy Act], Law No. 52 of 1946, art. 77 (Japan). 
 71 Shotoku zei hō [Income Tax Act], Law No. 27 of 1947, art. 63 (Japan). 
 72 Id. at art. 70. 
 73 See also text accompanying supra note 41. 
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The small and medium size business man—
shopkeeper, manufacturer, wholesaler, and so on—is 
the storm center of reassessment.  In practically all of 
the tax offices that we have examined, the vast 
majority of the income tax returns filed by the non-
farm group of self-assessed taxpayers have been 
deemed inadequate by the tax officials.  The amount 
reported as net income is marked up by the official, 
often by 50 percent or more, and not infrequently by 
more than 100 percent.  This has been done 
commonly, or at least fairly often, without any 
current investigation of the taxpayer’s premises or 
books, and without any explanation to him of how 
the reassessed amount was reached.  This is not to 
say that overassessment occurs frequently.  On the 
contrary, our impression is that, even after 
reassessment the net income of most of these 
taxpayers has still been understated.  But the hasty, 
arbitrary-appearing method itself is a barrier to 
obtaining that taxpayer compliance without which a 
recourse to some such method is almost inevitable.  
It will take time to break out of this vicious circle, 
but we are of the opinion that it can be done, 
provided the recent reforms in the structure of the 
Japanese tax administration and the detailed 
suggestion in the appendix to this report are 
adopted.74 
Surrey was of the opinion that the tax officials’ powers of 
inquiry and investigation should be expanded further to ascertain 
proper tax administration.75  To change the aforementioned situation, 
he argued that tax officials had to be empowered to acquire 
information held by third parties.  “Information should be sought 
from customers and suppliers of a business.  Bank deposits should 
be checked; the rules governing Tax Office access to bank records 
should be changed to permit more extensive examination.”76 
 
 74 REPORT, supra note 7, at 217. 
 75 Id. at Appendix D 20–27. 
 76 Id. at Appendix D 22. 
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Next, Surrey suggested that “[i]n order to expedite tax 
investigations, authorized tax officials and procurators should have 
the authority to administer oaths to which the appropriate penalty 
would attach.”77  However, his proposals also included measures 
that presumably benefited the taxpayers.  Among others, the 
following proposal with regard to reassessment draws our attention.  
The taxpayers’ right to know the basis of his tax is clearly 
articulated here: 
The taxpayer should be as fully informed as possible 
of the reasons for the reassessment.  Where the 
action is based on actual investigation, the Tax 
Offices are in a position fully to explain the reasons 
and the computation of the new tax amount.  Where 
the reassessment is based on standards, the 
information is necessarily more limited.  But in either 
case, the taxpayer is entitled to know why he has 
been reassessed and how his additional tax was 
computed.78 
In relation to the preceding proposal, Surrey suggested that 
the number of taxpayers’ protests against the reassessed amount 
should be limited and that they should not be required to pay tax 
until the disputes end.79  As to the former point, he proposed that 
“[t]he protest should be in writing, with the reasons specified.”80  He 
also recommended that appeals to the superior agency be limited or 
abolished.81  Even when disputes occur, he deemed it ideal that they 
be settled at the administrative stage rather than at the judicial 
stage.82  He also put forward a plan to establish a court or a panel 
specialized in taxation matters in order to manage them rapidly.83  
In the refund suits, “the taxpayer should have the initial 
responsibility of coming forward with evidence to show that the 
government’s administrative decision in erroneous.”84 
 
 77 Id. at Appendix D 23. 
 78 Id. at Appendix D 27. 
 79 Id. at Appendix D 27–28. 
 80 Id. at Appendix D 27. 
 81 Id. at Appendix D 30. 
 82 Id. at Appendix D 32. 
 83 Id. at Appendix D 36–38. 
 84 Id. at Appendix D 33. 
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3. A Tentative Summary 
Surrey proposed various measures to improve the 
relationship between taxpayers and tax officials.  He criticized the 
goal system in which the goal of tax revenue was set for each tax 
office.85  To achieve taxation based on the actual income of the 
taxpayers, he emphasized voluntary compliance of taxpayers with 
tax laws and the self-assessment of income tax liabilities.86  He 
offered several means to give taxpayers incentives to report their 
income as correctly as possible.87   He drew attention to dispute 
resolution in the context of income tax matters.  He demonstrated 
how the existing reassessment could be improved.88  He stressed 
that an extensive investigation program was necessary to execute 
the imposition of taxation according to the actual income.89 
C.  The Blue Return System in the Tax Acts 
1. The Tax Reform in 1950 
The Blue Return System was introduced in the Japanese tax 
system as soon as the Report was published.90  The tax reform acts 
of 1950 inserted provisions in the Income Tax Act and the 
Corporate Income Tax Act implementing the Blue Return System.91  
The revision inserted Article 26-4 into the Income Tax Act.92  The 
article stipulated that a taxpayer with business income, real property 
income, or forestry income may, under the authorization of the 
 
 85 Id. at 212–14, Appendix D 5–6. 
 86 Id. at 215, Appendix D 3–5. 
 87 Id. at Appendix D 12–14. 
 88 Id. at 217–18, Appendix D 20–27. 
 89 Id. at 218, Appendix D 20. 
 90 To start the Blue Return System from the year 1950, an act and an ordinance of 
Ministry of Finance were promulgated on December 15, 1949, under which keeping of 
books was mandatory for those who want to join the Blue Return System. See Shotoku zei 
no rinji tokurei ni kansuru hōritsu [Act Regarding the Provisional Measures on Income 
Tax], Law No. 269 of 1949, art. 2 (Japan); Ordinance No. 105 of the Ministry of Finance 
(Japan). 
 91 See generally Shotoku zei hō no ichibu wo kaisei suru hōritsu [Act on the Revision 
of the Income Tax Act of 1947], Law No. 71 of 1950 (Japan); Hōjin zei hō no ichibu wo 
kaisei suru hōritsu [Act on the Revision of the Corporate Tax Act of 1947], Law No. 72 of 
1950 (Japan). 
 92 Shotoku zei hō [Income Tax Act of 1947], Law No. 27 of 1947, art. 26-4 (Japan) 
(after the revision by Shotoku zei hō no ichibu wo kaisei suru hōritsu [Act on the Revision 
of the Income Tax Act of 1947]). 
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government, file a blue return.  Article 46-2, another new article, 
provided that, in principle, reassessment of the income of a blue 
return filer shall be allowed “only when investigations in the books 
and records of him is carried out and if omission is found on the 
investigations.”93  The second paragraph of Article 46-2 made it 
mandatory to note the “reasons of the reassessment” [kosei no riyu] 
in the letter of notification in this case.94  The same provisions were 
introduced in the Corporate Tax Act as well.95 
2. A Comparison of the New Provisions with the Report 
Although the idea of the blue return undoubtedly originated 
from the Report, the Blue Return System under the Income Tax Act 
of 1947 (after the tax reform of 1950) was materially different from 
the original proposals by Surrey in some crucial respects. 
First, in his proposals, the system would be applicable only 
to individual business owners. 96   He intended making the 
maintenance of books and records mandatory for all corporations.  
However, not only the Income Tax Act but also the Corporate 
Income Tax Act opted for the Blue Return System.  It meant that 
some of the corporations may avoid maintaining books and records 
by not joining the Blue Return System. 
Second, he did not associate giving reasons exclusively with 
the Blue Return System.  Rather, he located it as an element in his 
general plan to tax a taxpayer based on their actual income.  He 
argued that tax officials had no difficulty explaining to the taxpayer 
the grounds for assessment against him because they had acquired 
enough information on the taxpayer’s business affairs before 
making the assessment.97  Taxpayers who were assessed based on 
standards rather than actual amounts would also be entitled to know 
the reasons for the assessment, even when there is limited 
 
 93 Id. art. 46-2.  
 94 Id. The provisions of the Income Tax Act on the Blue Return System remain almost 
the same today. The Income Tax Act stipulates that the Head of Tax Office should, in case 
of making a reassessment of the amount of income shown in a blue return filed by 
residents, exhibit the reasons for the reassessment in the letter of reassessment. See 
SHOTOKU ZEI HŌ [INCOME TAX ACT OF 1965], art. 155, ¶ 2 (Japan). 
 95 Hōjin zei hō [Corporate Income Tax Act of 1947], Law No. 28 of 1947, arts. 25, 
31-3, & 32 (Japan) (after the revision by hōjin zei ho nō ichibu wo kaisei suru hōritsu [Act 
on the Revision of the Corporate Income Tax Act of 1947]). 
 96 REPORT, supra note 7, at 225. 
 97 Id. at Appendix D 27. 
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information. 98  However, the tax reforms in 1950 linked the 
requirement of giving reasons solely with the blue returns.  The tax 
acts did not guarantee that taxpayers other than blue return filers 
would get to know the reasons for the assessment when the 
assessment was made. 
The revision did not adopt most of Surrey’s proposals to 
authorize tax officials to enjoy greater powers.  The tax reforms of 
1950 did not delegate any additional authority to the tax office to 
investigate taxpayers and third parties backed by penalties.99  Nor 
did they give tax officials the authority to take sworn statements.100  
They did not follow Surrey’s advice on dispute resolution either.  
They did not demand that taxpayers had to specify reasons for 
protests against tax offices.101  They did not declare that a taxpayer 
bears the burden of proof in tax litigation, either.102  Surrey’s idea 
that taxpayers should be allowed to dispute reassessment before 
paying tax was not accepted.103 
Thus far, we have analyzed the text of the Report 
presumably as written by Surrey and scrutinized the influence of the 
text over the tax reforms of 1950.  However, it is not easy to discern 
Surrey’s true intentions from the text alone because it was fairly 
simply stated.  The ideas of the officials of the Ministry of Finance 
in Japan may have been included in the text.  Thus, we must 
examine Surrey’s earlier works on tax administration and use them 
as a key to understand his true intensions in the Report. 
III. THE TRAYNOR PLAN AND ITS INFLUENCE ON THE 
REPORT 
The articles that Surrey wrote in collaboration with Traynor 
laid the foundation for his proposals in the Report of the Shoup 
 
 98 Id. 
 99 Cf. Id. at Appendix D 20 (proposing that tax evaders shall know that they are to be 
ferreted out by investigation and charged with plus penalties). 
 100 Cf. Id. at Appendix D 23 (proposing that authorized tax officials shall have 
authority administer oaths to expedite investigation). 
 101 Cf. Id. at Appendix D 27–28 (proposing that taxpayers should be fully informed 
and entitled to know the reason for reassessment). 
 102 Cf. Id. at Appendix D 33 (proposing that taxpayers should bear the initial 
responsibility to show evidence of government’s erroneous). 
 103 Cf. Id. at Appendix D 28 (arguing that it is of disadvantage for taxpayers to pay 
reassessed tax before the final decision of reassessment reached, especially when the 
reassessment found to be improper). 
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Mission.  In this part, I will elaborate on their opinions and compare 
them with the text of the Report. 
A. Traynor and Surrey’s Suggestions on Tax Administration 
1. Who is Roger Traynor? 
Roger J. Traynor was born in 1900. He was a lawyer who 
later became an Associate Justice and then the Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court of California.104  In 1931, he began to teach taxation 
at the University of California.105  He also took part in drafting of 
taxation statutes for California.  In 1937, he was appointed as a 
consultant to the Treasury Department of the federal government.106  
In the same year, Surrey began to serve the Department as tax 
legislative counsel.107  Traynor and Surrey soon brought forward the 
Traynor Plan, a set of proposals to reform the federal tax 
administration.  The central aim of their plan was to clear away the 
congestion of tax disputes and to rationalize the whole process of 
income tax administration.108  Their plan stirred up considerable 
controversy and they eventually abandoned it.109 
I will now summarize the contents of the Traynor Plan and 
the related arguments put forward by Traynor and Surrey.  I will 
illustrate the significant features that the Traynor Plan and Surrey’s 
proposal in the Report have in common.  Traynor and Surrey have 
written four articles on the Plan.110   The following summary is 
 
 104 See Les Ledbetter, Roger J. Traynor, California Justice, N.Y.TIMES (May 17, 1983) 
(an obituary) (stating his achievement as a Justice); Adrian A. Kragen, Chief Justice 
Traynor and the Law of Taxation, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 801 (1984) (stating his achievement in 
the field of taxation); Mirit Eyal-Cohen, Preventive Tax Policy: Chief Justice Roger J. 
Traynor’s Tax Philosophy, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 877 (2008) (summarizing the philosophy of 
Traynor as the “preventive tax policy”). 
 105 KRAGEN, supra note 104, at 801–02. 
 106 Id. at 803. 
 107 Tax Notes, 58 TAXES 2 (1980). 
 108 See generally Surrey, Traynor Plan, infra note 110, 17 TAXES 393, at 441. 
 109 KRAGEN, supra note 104, at 804. 
 110 See generally Roger John Traynor, Administrative and Judicial Procedure for 
Federal Income, Estate, and Gift Taxes—A Criticism and a Proposal, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 
1393 (1938) (most comprehensive explanation of the plan written by Traynor with the 
cooperation of Surrey) [hereinafter Traynor, A Criticism and a Proposal]; Stanley S. Surrey, 
The Traynor Plan: What It Is, 17 TAXES 393 (1939) (providing a concise introduction to 
the Traynor Plan) [hereinafter Surrey, Traynor Plan]; Roger John Traynor & Stanley S. 
Surrey, New Roads toward the Settlement of Federal Income, Estate, and Gift Tax 
Controversies, 7 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 336 (1940) (including the proposal of the closing 
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founded on the most concise version as delivered by Surrey.111  
Surrey first pointed out five problems in tax administration at that 
time112.  He then mentioned five fundamental drawbacks.  Finally, 
he offered solutions to the problems he identified113.  I will use the 
most comprehensive article by Traynor that was published in 
Columbia Law Review as a supplement to Surrey’s article.114 
2. The Components of the Traynor Plan 
For Traynor and Surrey, the first problem in tax 
administration was the “present delay in the disposition of cases.”115  
Since plenty of cases were pending before the Board of Tax Appeals, 
it typically took nine years to dissolve a tax controversy.  Second, 
the vast majority of the cases were not resolved by judicial decisions 
but were settled by agreement. 116   Third, deficiencies were not 
collected sufficiently.117 Fourth, because of the considerable delay 
in the disposition of cases, the Board failed to issue guidance when 
the questions for which guidance was necessary were emerging.118 
Finally, many of the petitions to the Board involved only a small 
amount of tax, although agreements between the Commissioner and 
the taxpayer would be more appropriate for their disposition.119 
Behind these perceived problems, they found the following 
defects in the existing system.  First, before the Treasury’s 
decentralization program,120 a taxpayer who accepted a notice of 
 
agreements); Stanley S. Surrey, Some Suggested Topics in the Field of Tax Administration, 
25 WASH. U.L.Q. 399 (1940) (proceedings of the Surrey’s lecture followed by questions 
and answers). 
 111 Surrey, Traynor Plan, supra note 110. 
 112 Surrey, Traynor Plan, supra note 110, at 393–94 
 113 Id. at 395. 
 114 Traynor, A Criticism and a Proposal, supra note 110. 
 115 Surrey, Traynor Plan, supra note 110, at 393; Traynor, A Criticism and a Proposal, 
at 1395–96. 
 116 Surrey, Traynor Plan, supra note 110, at 393; Traynor, A Criticism and a Proposal, 
supra note 110, at 1393–95. 
 117 Surrey, Traynor Plan, supra note 110, at 393; Traynor, A Criticism and a Proposal, 
supra note 110, at 1396–97. 
 118 Traynor, A Criticism and a Proposal, supra note 110, at 1397–98. 
 119 Surrey, Traynor Plan, supra note 110, at 393–94; Traynor, A Criticism and a 
Proposal, supra note 110, at 1398. 
 120 In the fiscal year ending June 30, 1939, the Bureau of Internal Revenue 
(predecessor of the Internal Revenue Service) established ten field division offices and 
gave the head of the division office more powers than before. See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
MONOGRAPH OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 
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deficiency had every incentive to file a petition.121  He had nothing 
to lose in doing so, whereas he might have got a discount for his tax 
liability in the course of dispute resolution. 122   Second, the 
Commissioner was not able to collect necessary factual information 
on taxpayers but still issued notices of deficiency without any firm 
factual foundations because the burden of proof was on the 
taxpayers.123  This practice gave rise to a situation in which more 
than two-thirds of the notices were abandoned in due course.124  
Third, because the Federal District Courts and the Court of Claims, 
in addition to the Board of Tax Appeals, had original jurisdiction for 
federal tax matters, the case law on them was not consistent across 
various courts. 125   Furthermore, the existence of many federal 
appellate courts and the Supreme Court’s limited issuance of 
certiorari worsened the inconsistency in the case law on federal 
taxation.126 
The Traynor Plan, a proposal to solve problems, had two 
fundamental objectives, which are as shown below.127 
(1) With respect to the administrative procedure, to 
bring about an objective analysis of controversies in 
the administrative stage, thereby increasing the 
number of cases settled in that stage and stopping the 
flood of petitions to a Board which cannot possibly 
handle all of them. 
(2) With respect to the system of judicial review, to 
establish a simplified structure which will insure 
certainty and uniformity in tax decisions.128 
 
18 (1941). See generally Arthur A. Armstrong, Decentralization of the Bureau of Internal 
Revenue, 19 TAXES 90 (1941). 
 121 Surrey, Traynor Plan, supra note 110, at 394; Traynor, A Criticism and a Proposal, 
at 1398–1400. 
 122 Surrey, Traynor Plan, supra note 110, at 394; Traynor, A Criticism and a Proposal, 
at 1398–1400. 
 123 Surrey, Traynor Plan, supra note 110, at 394; Traynor, A Criticism and a Proposal, 
at 1400–02. 
 124 Surrey, Traynor Plan, supra note 110, at 394;  Traynor, A Criticism and a Proposal, 
supra note 110, at 1400–02. 
 125 Surrey, Traynor Plan, supra note 110, at 394; Traynor, A Criticism and a Proposal, 
supra note 110, at 1402–04. 
 126 Surrey, Traynor Plan, supra note 110, at 394–95; Traynor, A Criticism and a 
Proposal, supra note 110, at 1404–11. 
 127 Surrey, Traynor Plan, supra note 110, at 395. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol15/iss2/1
198 U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. [Vol. 15 
To achieve the preceding two goals, the Traynor Plan 
contained the following nine suggestions.  The first five were 
concerned with administrative procedure.129  First, the preliminary 
conferences, a procedure before the issuance of informal notice of 
deficiency (the thirty-day letter), had to be more fully utilized.130  
Second, the informal notice of deficiency had to become a formal 
practice and the protest against it had to be made mandatory for a 
taxpayer to proceed to the next stage.131  The taxpayer had to show 
the grounds of protest, relevant facts, and evidence for them. Third, 
when the Commissioner issued a final notice of deficiency (the 
ninety-day letter), it “would contain specific findings of fact on the 
matters involved, so that the taxpayer will have definite advice of 
the case against him.”132  Fourth, at the petition with the Board 
against the notice of deficiency, the scope of the review had to be 
limited.133  They suggested the following four conditions: 
(1) The taxpayer in his proof before the Board would 
be limited to the grounds, documents and facts 
outlined in his protest. 
(2) The Commissioner in his proof would be limited 
to the issue and facts contained in the findings of fact. 
He could no longer present a claim before the Board 
for an additional deficiency. 
(3) The taxpayer, as at present, would have the 
burden of proving that the findings of fact were 
erroneous. 
(4) To insure the collectability of any deficiency 
found by the Board, it may be desirable to require the 
 
 128 Id. 
 129 Traynor, A Criticism and a Proposal, supra note 110, at 1411–25. 
 130 Surrey, Traynor Plan, supra note 110, at 395.; Traynor, A Criticism and a Proposal, 
supra note 110, at 1411–12. 
 131 Surrey, Traynor Plan, supra note 110, at 395; Traynor, A Criticism and a Proposal, 
supra note 110, at 1412–14. 
 132 Surrey, Traynor Plan, supra note 110, at 395; Traynor, A Criticism and a Proposal, 
supra note 110, at 1415. 
 133 Surrey, Traynor Plan, supra note 110, at 395; Traynor, A Criticism and a Proposal, 
supra note 110, at 1418–21. 
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taxpayer to post a bond or other security at the time 
of filing his petition with the Board.134 
Surrey summarized their plans for the reform of 
administrative procedure as follows. 
In short, the requirement of a protest would force 
disclosure of the facts either in the protest itself or in 
the preliminary conference preceding it, in view of 
the taxpayer’s knowledge that the facts would have 
to be disclosed later in any event.  The findings of 
fact would force the Commissioner to make a 
realistic appraisal of his case in the administrative 
stage.  The limitations on proof before the Board 
would serve to insure the efficacy of both protest and 
findings of fact.135 
They did not want to make the findings of fact by the 
Commissioner final.136  They emphasized that the finality of the 
findings by an agency must be backed by a formal process of 
adjudication and that such a process was impossible when taxpayers 
disclosed only limited information.137  Finally, they claimed that the 
deficiency procedure and refund procedures had to be consistent.138 
They offered four plans to improve judicial procedure.  The 
objectives of the plans were as follows: 
(1) Reduction in the number of tribunals passing 
upon tax questions, together with effective 
machinery for the resolution of conflicting decisions, 
in order to achieve uniformity and certainty in tax 
decisions. 
(2) Elimination of present method of appellate 
review of Board decisions. 
 
 134 Surrey, Traynor Plan, supra note 110, at 395. 
 135 Id. 
 136 Id. at 396; Traynor, A Criticism and a Proposal, supra note 110, at 1421. 
 137 Surrey, Traynor Plan, supra note 110, at 396; Traynor, A Criticism and a Proposal, 
supra note 110, at 1421. 
 138 Traynor, A Criticism and a Proposal, supra note 110, at 1422–25. 
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(3) Guarantee of collectability of tax in cases 
proceeding to the judicial stage.139 
First, they proposed that original jurisdiction in tax cases be 
concentrated in the Board of Tax Appeals. 140   Second, they 
recommended decentralizing the Board into five divisions.141  By 
doing so, they suggested that expeditious trial of petitions filed with 
the Board would be possible.  Third, they argued that a Court of Tax 
Appeals had to be established instead of the present appellate 
jurisdiction of Circuit Court of Appeals.142  Finally, they suggested 
that taxpayers had to file a bond on a petition before the Board to 
guarantee collectability of their tax dues.143 
B. Aftermath of the Traynor Plan 
Although the Traynor Plan was largely consistent with other 
proposals to improve tax administration, 144  including the 
decentralization program launched by the Treasury Department,145 it 
was open to fierce criticisms by the practitioners.146  The Report of 
the Special Committee to Study the Traynor Plan appointed in the 
American Bar Association (ABA Report), the most comprehensive 
criticism against the Traynor Plan, showed that the criticism derived 
from the practitioners’ strong sense of antipathy toward the 
personnel in the Treasury.  We will now outline the criticism by the 
American Bar Association. 
 
 139 Id. at 1425. 
 140 Surrey, Traynor Plan, supra note 110, at 396; Traynor, A Criticism and a Proposal, 
supra note 110, at 1425–26. 
 141 Surrey, Traynor Plan, supra note 110, at 396; Traynor, A Criticism and a Proposal, 
supra note 110, at 1426–27. 
 142 Surrey, Traynor Plan, supra note 110, at 396; Traynor, A Criticism and a Proposal, 
supra note 110, at 1427–33. 
 143 Traynor, A Criticism and a Proposal, supra note 110, at 1433–35. 
 144 See, e.g., Robert H. Jackson, Equity in the Administration of Federal Taxes, 13 
TAXES 641, 642–43 (1935). See also Kirk J. Stark, The Unfulfilled Tax Legacy of Justice 
Robert H. Jackson, 54 TAX L. REV. 171, 180–81 (2001) (analyzing Justice Jackson’s ideas 
on taxation). 
 145 Surrey, Traynor Plan, supra note 110, at 395. 
 146 See, e.g., John M. Maguire, Federal Revenue: Internal or Infernal, 21 TAXES 77, 
122 (1943); REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE SO-CALLED TRAYNOR PLAN, 
1940 A.B.A. SEC. TAX’N PROGRAM & COMM. REP. 64, 64 (1940) [hereinafter A.B.A.]. See 
also EYAL-COHEN, supra note 104, at 899. 
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The ABA Report began with the characterization of the 
Traynor Plan.147  It pointed out the “quasi-official” nature of the 
plan. 148   It found fault with the understanding of the present 
situation by the plan.149  The main argument of the ABA Report was 
that the “defects” found by Traynor and Surrey were not defects at 
all: The number of disputes per tax revenue is not on the rise.150  
The ABA Report did not find any delay in the adjustment of tax 
controversies. 151   It claimed that the Commissioner had enough 
power to collect necessary information from taxpayers.152 
Next, the ABA Report criticized each of the proposals of the 
Traynor Plan.  First, the ABA Report insisted that the present 
informal nature of the communications between the tax officials and 
the taxpayers would be lost by the Traynor Plan’s proposal seeking 
the limiting of the objectives of tax disputes.153  Second, the ABA 
Report indicated that by placing the burden of proof on taxpayers, 
the Traynor Plan regarded the findings by the Commissioner as 
supported by substantial evidence.154  However, as we have shown, 
Traynor and Surrey had clearly denied this understanding.155  Third, 
the ABA Report claimed that requiring a bond before tax disputes 
was not a good idea.156  Finally, the ABA Report declined all of the 
Traynor Plan’s ideas on the reform of the tax judicial process.157 
In short, the ABA Report rejected almost all the proposals 
by the Traynor Plan without seriously considering their 
appropriateness.  It found no defects in the contemporary state of 
affairs and therefore preferred to maintain the status quo than to 
make any changes.158 
As a result of the criticism, the Traynor Plan was not put into 
practice. 159   Nevertheless, the plan’s spirit survived in Justice 
Traynor’s opinions in the decisions of the Supreme Court of 
 
 147 A.B.A., supra note 146, at 65. 
 148 Id. 
 149 Id. at 65–69. 
 150 Id. at 66. 
 151 Id. at 67–68. 
 152 Id. at 68. 
 153 Id. at 71. 
 154 Id. at 72. 
 155 See generally Surrey, Traynor Plan, supra note 110, at 396. 
 156 A.B.A., supra note 146, at 73–74. 
 157 Id. at 74–77. 
 158 Id. at 64. 
 159 EYAL-COHEN, supra note 104, at 899. 
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California and in the reform proposals by scholars.160  Moreover, 
ideas from the Traynor Plan flew directly into the Report of the 
Shoup Mission, as I will show in the next section. 
C. Comparison of the Traynor Plan with Surrey’s Proposal in 
the Report of the Shoup Mission 
Surrey’s proposals in the Report of the Shoup Mission have 
much in common with the ideas indicated in the Traynor Plan.  First, 
both the Traynor Plan and the Report advocated the policy of giving 
a taxpayer a sufficient incentive to disclose information at the 
earliest stage possible.161  It was intended to mitigate the congestion 
of tax disputes and at the same time it aimed to realize taxation 
according to the actual amount of income.  The state of affairs in 
postwar Japan in terms of congestion differed from that of the US in 
the late 1930s.  In the US, there were many petitions pending before 
both the Bureau and the Board. 162   In Japan, the number of 
reassessments were large.  However, the number of petitions against 
them seemed to have been small although the Report did not 
indicate any precise number.  The quantity of tax litigation was also 
very small. 163   Nonetheless, the Report forecasted a substantial 
increase in tax cases and then proposed precautionary measures 
against the problem.164  From this passage, we may infer that Surrey 
wrote his part of the Report with the Traynor Plan in mind. 
Second, cooperation between the tax officials and the 
taxpayers aimed at reaching the true amount of income was an 
important component both in the Traynor Plan and in the Report.  It 
is true that the taxpayers must first submit necessary information to 
tax officials because the taxpayers have all the necessary 
information to determine their tax liability.165  However, after that, 
in Surrey’s proposals, both parties were treated symmetrically in tax 
 
 160 Id. at 899–907. 
 161 REPORT, supra note 7, at Appendix D 3–5; Traynor, A Criticism and a Proposal, 
supra note 110, at 1395–96. 
 162 Surrey, Traynor Plan, supra note 110, at 393; Traynor, A Criticism and a Proposal, 
supra note 110, at 1395–96. 
 163 REPORT, supra note 7, at 220–21. 
 164 Id. 
 165 REPORT, supra note 7, at Appendix D 22; Surrey, Some Suggested Topics in the 
Field of Tax Administration, supra note 110, at 394; Traynor, A Criticism and a Proposal, 
supra note 110, at 1400–02. 
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administration.  Both were required to indicate their judgments on 
tax liability, whether in the notice of deficiency or reassessment or 
in protest against them, with sufficient reasons and evidence 
supporting them.166  In other words, Surrey demanded that taxpayers 
had to play a greater role than generally assumed in ascertaining 
their actual income.  The requirement of giving reasons obviously 
makes the administrative tribunal and the court consider exclusively 
legal issues rather than factual ones, thereby helping realize the first 
point mentioned above. 
Through the foregoing comparison with the Traynor Plan, 
we now have a far more detailed picture of Surrey’s proposals in the 
Report.  He certainly proposed the Blue Return System.  He also 
recommended giving reasons in the letter of reassessment.  
However, these were merely a means to achieve his ideals in tax 
administration, that is taxation according to the taxpayers’ actual 
income with fewer disputes between the tax officials and taxpayers.  
Under the ideals, each taxpayer’s tax liability would be computed 
based on all the relevant information of the taxpayer.  The burden of 
the appeal process and the judicial system would be relieved 
because most of the controversies on facts were settled beforehand. 
Surrey considered the requirement for giving reasons as one 
of the means to limit the scope of disputes between tax officials and 
taxpayers.  He did not consider it as a safeguard for taxpayers 
against tax authorities.  It sometimes benefits taxpayers, but does so 
only by chance.  Neither the Report nor the Traynor Plan offered 
evidence that Surrey sought the protection of taxpayers against 
governmental powers.  It is not clear whether he thought about the 
concepts of notice and hearing, one of the basic principles in 
administrative procedure.167  However, considering the absence of 
references to procedural rights of private parties in informal 
adjudication in contemporary materials, it may safely be assumed 
that he did not.168 
 
 166 See REPORT, supra note 7, at Appendix D 27, 33, & 58; Surrey, Traynor Plan, 
supra note 110, at 395; Traynor, A Criticism and a Proposal, supra note 110, at 1412–14, 
1415, & 1418–21. 
 167 Cf. HALEY, supra note 28, at 561–63 (indicating the members of Legislation and 
Justice Division of SCAP were in the opinion that Japan should provide for the concept in 
legislation). 
 168 Cf. MONOGRAPH OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCEDURE, supra note 120. See also ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON 
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IV. IGNORANCE AND EXCESSIVE ACCEPTANCE OF 
SURREY’S PROPOSALS IN POSTWAR JAPAN 
A. The Long-Term Consequences of Surrey’s Proposals in the 
Report 
As I have demonstrated in the preceding chapters, the crux 
of Surrey’s proposals in the Report of the Shoup Mission lay in 
realizing a rapid resolution of tax disputes and preventing disputes 
from occurring in the first place.  To bring about these ideals, he 
made three proposals as below.  First, he argued that the object of a 
tax dispute had to be a single factual or legal issue.  He tried to 
realize the proposal by encouraging taxpayers to submit facts that 
would form the basis of his liability.  Second, he supposed a 
dichotomy, in which a blue return filer, a taxpayer with sufficient 
records and books, calculated his income according to them, 
whereas a taxpayer without them would be subject to taxation based 
on some kind of standards.  Third, he proposed that the tax officials 
had to have far more power to investigate and interrogate taxpayers.  
His idea of giving reasons in the assessment against a blue return 
filer is a component of the first proposal.169  It would have been 
possible only when the third proposal is realized. 
In reality, however, the third proposal was not 
accomplished.170  The power of tax officials was relatively restricted.  
To make matters worse, the number of tax officials and their 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE (1941). 
 169 Vicki L. Beyer, The Legacy of the Shoup Mission: Taxation Inequities and Tax 
Reform in Japan, 10 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 388, 395–96 (1992). 
 170 Except for Ryokichi Sugimoto, a judge at the Tokyo District Court, who 
persistently made arguments loyal to that of Surrey, nobody ever tried to promote Surrey’s 
original idea. Cf. Ryokichi Sugimoto, Zeikin sosho ni okeru shoko moshide no junjo [The 
Order of Providing Evidence in Tax Cases], 17 ZAISEI 102 (1952) (explaining the debate 
over the burden of proof after the recommendation by the Shoup Mission); Ryokichi 
Sugimoto, Sozeiho no kaishaku no doko [Trends in the Interpretation of Tax Law], 29 
HORITSU JIHO 1074 (1957); Ryokichi Sugimoto, Sozei sosho no jittai to kihon mondai 
[Present Status and Fundamental Problems of Tax litigation], 1 KINYU HOMU JIJO (7)1 
(1958) (a proposal on tax litigation process very similar to Surrey’s idea); Ryokichi 
Sugimoto, Gyosei jiken sosho no chien [Delay in Administrative Litigation], 30 HORITSU 
JIHO 1260 (1958); Ryokichi Sugimoto, Gyosei jiken sosho [Administrative Litigation], 465 
HANREI JIHO 21332 (1967); Ryokichi Sugimoto, Gyosei jiken sosho ni okeru saibansho no 
yakuwari [The Role of the Court in Administrative Litigation], 156 HOGAKU SEMINA 2 
(1969). 
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abilities were also limited.  These factors made the fulfillment of the 
second proposal impossible.  Tax officials were forced to use certain 
kinds of standards to calculate the income of some blue return filers 
because the tax officials were not able to collect necessary 
information on them.  Further, some of the court decisions began to 
allow taxpayers who had their liabilities assessed according to a 
standard to argue that the tax liability was incorrectly assessed not 
because the standard was inappropriate but because the alleged tax 
liability did not reflect his true income.  In other words, the courts 
permitted taxpayers who did not file blue returns to rebut 
reassessments by the actual amount of revenue or expenditure.  This 
practice of the courts, along with the use of standards for the blue 
return filers, significantly blurred the distinction between blue 
returns filers and non-blue returns filers.  Moreover, the judges 
declined to limit the object of a tax dispute to a single issue.  Rather, 
they preferred to judge the appropriateness of a taxpayer’s liability 
of a given year as a whole.  Thus, the first proposal by Surrey was 
not put into practice.  Thus, the legislature and the judiciary did not 
employ any of Surrey’s core proposals. 
Despite the apparent ignorance of Surrey’s proposals, the tax 
administration of Japan in the latter half of the twentieth century 
almost lived up to Surrey’s ideals.  It did not experience the 
congestion of tax disputes that Surrey predicted and was deeply 
afraid of.  It is difficult to pin down the precise reasons for the 
achievement.  However, I believe that the following two points 
contributed toward achieving the goal. 
Courts rarely declare tax liability determined in a self-
assessment or reassessment void [mukō].  In Japan, a tax refund 
claim is considered as a restitution claim.  In a restitution suit, every 
administrative disposition is deemed correct.171  The administrative 
disposition would even be revoked if it were disputed in a suit in 
which the plaintiff exclusively claimed that the disposition was 
illegal.  It follows that it is extremely difficult for a taxpayer to 
recover the amount of tax paid through a refund suit.  Then, it 
becomes rational for the tax officials to strongly recommend that the 
taxpayer file an amended return rather than to assess the deficiency 
by themselves.  When they make an assessment, the taxpayer may 
challenge the assessment and then the tax dispute goes on.  
 
 171 See generally ISHIMURA, supra note 10, 125–26. 
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However, if the taxpayer amends the return, the tax officials are 
almost relieved from the risk of continued involvement in the 
dispute. 
Upon an assessment of deficiency, the tax authorities of 
Japan have the power to start a collection procedure for the 
deficiency amount even if the taxpayer in question does not agree 
with the assessment.172  This power is horrifying especially for a 
taxpayer without sufficient financial resources because it could 
destroy his economic life.  Thus, both tax officials and taxpayers 
would, in most cases, arrive at a reasonable compromise.  To avoid 
the worst case scenario, it is rational for the taxpayer to admit the 
existence of deficiency even if he does not entirely agree with the 
alleged amount of deficiency.  Since tax officials wanted to end tax 
disputes, as explained above, they offered taxpayers reasonable 
discounts if they consented to filing an amended return. 
The ideas Surrey presented were largely ignored in the tax 
administration in Japan.  However, an important part of his 
proposals, namely the requirement of giving reasons in the notice of 
assessment was accepted and magnified greatly by the judiciary.173  
In the next section, I will trace the development of the doctrine on 
giving reasons and explain how it became a unique doctrine in 
Japanese administrative law. 
 
 172 It is a principle applicable to the administrative dispositions in general. See Gyōsei 
jiken soshō hō [Administrative Case Litigation Act], Law No. 139 of 1962, art. 25 (Japan). 
In the United States, the rule is the same as that in Japan as long as federal taxation is 
concerned. See I.R.C. § 6331–44. Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931) 
(constitutionality of the provisions). But the Internal Revenue Code stipulates a broad 
exception. See I.R.C. § 6213 (a) (prohibiting the government from proceeding to the 
collection until the specified dates). Cf. supra note 103 and accompanying text for the 
comment of Surrey with regard to this point. For a comprehensive explanation of the 
question whether the execution of an administrative determination stays or not in various 
contexts, see Reginald Parker, The Execution of Administrative Acts, 24 U. CHI. L. REV. 
292 305 (1957) (“[T]he tax claim will not become delinquent without judicial review or an 
opportunity for it”). See also Reginald Parker, Administrative Law Through Foreign 
Glasses: The Austrian Experience, 15 RUTGERS L. REV. 551, 565 (1961) (in Austria, every 
administrative agency has the power to execute its own decisions); L. Harold Levinson, 
Toward Principles of Public Law, 19 J. PUB. L. 327, 358–59 (1970) (in France, every 
administrative decision possesses the same enforceability as a court judgment). 
 173 For an overview of the early cases, see Shin’ichi Takayanagi, Aoiro shinkoku ni 
taisuru kosei no riyu fuki [Giving Reasons in the Assessments against the Blue Return 
Filers], SOZEI HANREI HYAKUSEN 166 (Ichiro Ogawa & Hiroshi Kaneko eds., 1968). 
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B. Development of the Common Law Doctrine on Giving 
Reasons 
1. Udono case 
Shortly after the introduction of the Blue Return System, 
cases on the requirement of giving reasons began to appear.174  In 
these cases, the Heads of Tax Office did not clearly explain their 
decision-making process or the evidence supporting their positions 
in their letters informing taxpayers of the assessments.  In some 
cases, they did not indicate any reason at all.175 Sometimes, they 
notified taxpayers of the reasons at a later date.176  In these cases, 
taxpayers argued that the assessments were defective and had to be 
revoked. 177   At first, the National Tax Agency claimed that 
provisions for giving reasons in the Income Tax Act and the 
Corporate Income Tax Act were not requirements but only 
instructions.178  However, not all lower court decisions followed this 
claim.179  Rather, although gradually, some of the courts began to 
hold that the assessments without specified reasons were defective 
and thus, they revoked them.180 
In 1962, the Supreme Court indicated, although in its obiter 
dicta, that when a Regional Commissioner failed to note the reasons 
for his ruling upon a taxpayer’s appeal, his decision turned 
 
 174 Id. 
 175 See e.g., Yokohama Chihō Saibansho [Yokohama Dist. Ct.] Dec. 28, 1955, Sho 30 
(gyo) No. 2, 6 GYŌSEI JIKEN SAIBAN REISHŪ [GYŌSAI REISHŪ] 2893 (Japan). 
 176 See e.g., Hiroshima Chihō Saibansho [Hiroshima Dist. Ct.] May 29, 1958, Sho 30 
(gyo) No. 11, 9 GYŌSEI JIKEN SAIBAN REISHŪ [GYŌSAI REISHŪ] 986 (Japan). 
 177 For the meaning of “revocation” of an administrative disposition, see text definition 
in supra note 17. 
 178 See e.g., Yokohama Chihō Saibansho [Yokohama Dist. Ct.] Dec. 28, 1955, Sho 30 
(gyo) No. 2, 6 GYŌSEI JIKEN SAIBAN REISHŪ [GYŌSAI REISHŪ] 2893 (Japan); Nara Chihō 
Saibansho [Nara Dist. Ct.] Sept. 16, 1958, Sho 29 (gyo) No. 7, 9 GYŌSAI REISHŪ 1916. 
(Japan). 
 179 See e.g., Yokohama Chihō Saibansho [Yokohama Dist. Ct.] Dec. 28, 1955, Sho 30 
(gyo) No. 2, 6 GYŌSEI JIKEN SAIBAN REISHŪ [GYŌSAI REISHŪ] 2893 (Japan); Nara Chihō 
Saibansho [Nara Dist. Ct.] Sept. 16, 1958, Sho 29 (gyo) No. 7, 9 GYŌSAI REISHŪ 1916. 
(Japan). 
 180 See e.g., Yokohama Chihō Saibansho [Yokohama Dist. Ct.] Dec. 28, 1955, Sho 30 
(gyo) No. 2, 6 GYŌSEI JIKEN SAIBAN REISHŪ [GYŌSAI REISHŪ] 2893 (Japan); Nara Chihō 
Saibansho [Nara Dist. Ct.] Sept. 16, 1958, Sho 29 (gyo) No. 7, 9 GYŌSAI REISHŪ 1916. 
(Japan). 
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revocable.181  In this case, the issue was whether the Commissioner 
should inform the taxpayer of the reasons for his decision in an 
adversarial administrative adjudication, even though the procedure 
was far less formal than that of independent administrative 
committees.182  Thus, requiring the Regional Commissioner to give 
reasons was entirely understandable in this case.  Further, the 
original tax assessment was maintained in the case. 
In 1963, the Supreme Court decided upon Udono, where it 
followed the decisions of the lower courts and revoked tax 
assessments that did not offer a sufficient notification of reasons.183  
This attitude of the Court is surprising.  When an assessment is 
revoked by the court, the Head of Tax Office cannot make another 
because of the statute of limitation.  The Court thus called for 
compliance with the requirement of giving reasons at the sacrifice 
of proper taxation in each of these cases.184 
The facts of the Udono case are as follows.  Mr. Shizuhiro 
Udono was a retailer of shoes in Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo prefecture.  He 
was a blue return filer since 1953.  On March 14, 1957, he filed his 
tax return for his annual income in 1956.  In this return, he alleged 
that his income was 309,000 yen in 1956.  On July 29, 1957, 
however, the Head of Koishikawa Tax Office assessed Udono’s 
deficiency based on the determination that his income in 1956 was 
444,000 yen.  The Head of Koishikawa Tax Office wrote, in a letter 
notifying Mr. Udono of the assessment, saying, “Considering your 
gross profit ratio, the amount of profit in your books is too small. I 
corrected the amount with reference to your actual gross profit ratio 
based on our investigation and therefore corrected the amount of 
income.”185  I translated the original statements written in Japanese 
 
 181 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 26, 1962, Sho 36 (o) No. 409, 16 SaikŌ Saibansho 
Minji HanreishŪ [MinshŪ] 2557 (Japan) (Amakasu sangyo kisen kabushiki gaisha 
[Amakasu Industrial Steamship, Co., Ltd.] v. Shiba zemimusho cho [Head of Shiba Tax 
Office]). For an excellent overview of the development of the cases beginning in this case, 
see Shizuo Fujiwara, Riyu fuki hanrei ni miru gyosei tetsuzuki hosei no riron to jitsumu, 
[The Theory and Practice of the APA thorough the Cases on Giving Reasons], 3 Ronkyu 
jurisuto 67 (2012). 
 182 NATHANSON & FUJITA, supra note 33, 302–33. 
 183 See supra notes 14–17. 
 184 See generally I.R.C. § 7522(a), supra note 16. 
 185 17 MINSHŪ, at 620. Udono case was discussed in the subcommittee on the tax 
system and the tax administration under the Finance Committee of the House of 
Representatives. See generally Dai 31 kai kokkai shugiin okura iinkai zeisei narabini zei no 
shikko ni kansuru sho iin kaigiroku [The Thirty-First Diet, Official Record of the Debates 
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into English.  However, the precise meaning of the original 
statements is far from completely clear.  Mr. Udono disputed the 
assessment, first by asking the Head of the Tax Office for 
reconsideration and, next by asking the Regional Commissioner of 
Tokyo Regional Tax Bureau for reviewing the assessment.  Both the 
Head of the Tax Office and the Regional Commissioner rejected his 
claim.  To make matters worse, while informing Mr. Udono of their 
decisions, neither offered any reasons or explanations. 
Mr. Udono filed a lawsuit against the Regional 
Commissioner.  In the lawsuit, he claimed that the “reasons” that the 
Head of the Tax Office had written in the letter of assessment and 
the “reasons” that the Regional Commissioner had written in the 
notification letter were both too abstract and their meanings were 
not clear.  In effect, they failed to note the reasons, and therefore the 
assessment by the Head of the Tax Office and the determination by 
the Regional Commissioner were both illegal and the assessment 
had to be revoked.186  In the first instance at the Tokyo District 
Court, the Regional Commissioner, the defendant, argued that the 
“reasons” that the two officials had given were sufficient and that 
the assessment did not need to be revoked.  However, the Court 
affirmed the plaintiff’s claim.187 
In the second instance before the Tokyo High Court, the 
defendant clarified the process of calculating the allegedly correct 
income.188  According to him, the tax officials at the Koishikawa 
Tax Office had first found that the amount of income in Mr. 
Udono’s tax return was too small when compared with that of the 
other retailers with similar amounts of gross sales.  They then 
investigated his books and records and found several omissions 
from them and estimated his gross profit ratio.  By adding the 
 
in the Subcommittee on the Tax System and the Tax Administration under the Finance 
Committee of the House of Representatives], No. 2 (Feb. 18, 1959) and No. 3 (Feb. 25, 
1959) (Japan). I did not find out whether the debates in the Diet had an influence on the 
Supreme Court decision. 
 186 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] May 31, 1963, Sho 36 (o) no. 84, 17 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO 
MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 617, 630–31 (Japan) (Udono v. Tokyo kokuzeikyoku cho 
[Regional Commissioner of Tokyo Regional Taxation Bureau]). 
 187 Tōkyō Chihō Saibansho [Tokyo Dist. Ct.] Feb. 4, 1959, Sho 33 (gyō) no. 55, 10 
Gyōsai reishū 287 (Japan) (Udono v. Tokyo kokuzeikyoku cho [Regional Commissioner of 
Tokyo Regional Taxation Bureau]). 
 188 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] May 31, 1963, Sho 36 (o) no.84, 17 Saikō Saibansho 
Minji Hanreishū [Minshū] 617, 633–35 (Japan) (Udono v. Tokyo kokuzeikyoku cho 
[Regional Commissioner of Tokyo Regional Taxation Bureau]). 
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omissions and using this new ratio, the Head of the Tax Office 
assessed Mr. Udono’s income tax for 1956.  The Tokyo High Court 
reversed the decision of the original instance and held that the 
statements in the letter of assessment and those in the notification 
letter were both sufficient reasons because the taxpayer was able to 
understand the contents of the assessment by reading the 
statements.189 
The Supreme Court reversed this decision and unanimously 
held that the statements in the letters were insufficient as proper 
reasons and ruled that the assessment had to be revoked.190  The 
Supreme Court first articulated the aim of giving reasons in 
administrative dispositions in general.191  The Court said that in the 
context of income tax, since the Income Tax Act guaranteed a 
taxpayer who chose to join the Blue Return System that his books 
and records would be respected, the content of the reasons in the 
letter of assessment had to explain the basis for the assessment 
based on materials that have more power of persuasion than the 
statement in the taxpayer’s books.192   The Court found that the 
“reasons” in the letter of assessment in this case were inadequate 
because from the statement, the taxpayer would not have been able 
to understand the extent of omission, the account for which the 
omission was found, the basis for the calculation of the amount, the 
basis for the calculation of the gross profit ratio, and the justification 
for using the ratio.193  Thus, the Court held that the reasons were 
invalid and the assessment had to be revoked.194 
Although the decision was surprisingly favorable to the 
taxpayer, it was anticipated by several commentators.  In a short 
case comment published in April 1962, Kenzo Shiraishi, a highly 
respected judge at the Tokyo District Court specialized in 
administrative law, explained the significance of the requirement of 
 
 189 Tōkyō Kōtō Saibansho [Tokyo High Ct.] Oct. 27, 1960, Sho 34 (ne) no. 356, 17 
MinshŪ 632 (Japan) (Tokyo kokuzeikyoku cho [Regional Commissioner of Tokyo 
Regional Taxation Bureau] v. Udono). 
 190 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] May 31, 1963, Sho 36 (o) no. 84, 17 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO 
MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 617, 621 (Japan).  
 191 Id. at 620. 
 192 Id. 620–21. 
 193 Id. 
 194 Id. at 622. 
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giving reasons in general.195  His remarks were followed almost 
word for word in Udono.196   Hiroshi Shiono, the then associate 
professor of administrative law at the University of Tokyo, made a 
comment similar to that of Shiraishi in September 1962.197 
2. Development of the Common Law Doctrine after Udono 
The Supreme Court reaffirmed its decision in Udono in 
Kameya Sewing Shop, a corporate income tax case.198  In Kameya 
Sewing Shop, the Court cited Udono and held that a reassessment 
without sufficient reasons had to be revoked irrespective of the fact 
that the taxpayer in question was able to estimate the reasons at the 
time of the reassessment.199 
Contemporary commentators (other than the officials of the 
National Tax Agency) welcomed the common law doctrine offered 
by Udono that an assessment would be revoked when one of the 
requirements for it was defective.200  This doctrine was not self-
evident because it may well be argued that a slight defect in the 
procedural requirement does not make the assessment revocable.  
Further, almost all commentators agreed with the Supreme Court. 
201  The conclusion is not obvious because even if one wants to 
penalize the tax authorities for failing to give sufficient reasons, 
there are other ways to do so, such as forcing them to pay damages 
to the taxpayers or imposing a punishment on the officials in charge 
internally.  However, nobody suggested such alternatives. 
There was a slight but sharp disagreement in theorizing the 
core idea of the Udono decision.  Some commentators understood 
 
 195 Kenzo Shiraishi, Sogan saiketsusho no riyu fuki [Giving Reasons in Administrative 
Adjudication], in GYOSEI HANREI HYAKUSEN 165, 166 (1962). 
 196 This fact is pointed out by Shizuo Fujiwara. See FUJIWARA, supra note 181. 
 197 SHIONO, supra note 24. 
 198 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 27, 1963, Sho 37 (o) no. 1015, 17 SaikŌ Saibansho 
Minji HanreishŪ [MinshŪ] 1871 (Japan) (Kabushiki gaisha kameya ito ten [Kameya 
Sewing Shop, Co., Ltd.] v. Maebashi zeimusho chō [Head of Maebashi Tax Office]). In 
this decision, one out of five justices dissented. Justice Sakunosuke Yamada argued that 
the statement in the letter of assessment (“lack of the amount of sale by 190,500 yen”) was 
acceptable as the “reason” of the assessment. 
 199 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 27, 1963, Sho 37 (o) no. 1015, 17 SAIKŌ 
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1871, 1873 (Japan) (Kabushiki gaisha kameya ito 
ten [Kameya Sewing Shop, Co., Ltd.] v. Maebashi zeimusho chō [Head of Maebashi Tax 
Office]). 
 200 See, e.g., KANEKO, supra note 11. 
 201 Id.  
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the decision as an example of formal errors or defects.202  In other 
words, they located the decision in a series of cases in which the 
validity of an administrative disposition lacking some of its formal 
requirements was the issue.  According to the traditional account of 
the issue of formal errors, which was originally imported from 
German administrative law, 203  an administrative disposition was 
considered void when the formal errors in question are crucial, 
whereas it is considered valid when errors are trivial.204  However, 
the commentators on the Udono decision declined the dichotomy 
and instead claimed that an administrative disposition with formal 
errors may be revocable when the parties concerned dispute the 
validity of the disposition.  This argument is not convincing because 
it is quite difficult if not impossible to explain why a valid 
administrative disposition turns revocable once the parties 
concerned begin to dispute its validity. 
That is why other commentators deemed Udono as a 
variation of a general principle of administrative procedure.  For 
example, in a case comment on another Supreme Court decision, 
Hiroshi Kaneko, then associate professor of tax law at the 
University of Tokyo, wrote as follows: 
Though the requirement of giving reasons in an 
administrative disposition is one of the formal 
requirements, it has considerable significance and 
should be distinguished from merely formal 
requirements such as the statement of the date of the 
disposition.  In view of that the aim of the 
requirement is to guarantee the substantive 
appropriateness of an administrative disposition, the 
 
 202 See, e.g., JIRO TANAKA, SHIMPAN GYOSEIHO VOL. 1, 148 (2nd Revised ed., 1974). 
For one of the most comprehensive narrative of this position, see NISHITOBA, supra note 21. 
 203 For the influence of German law on the modern administrative law of Japan, see 
John Ohnesorge, Administrative Law in East Asia: A Comparative-Historical Analysis, 
COMP. ADMIN. L. 78, 82–83 (Susan Rose-Ackerman & Peter L. Lindseth eds., 2011). For a 
description of the treatment of procedural errors in Germany, see, e.g., PÜNDER, infra note 
218, 953–55. 
 204 See, e.g., SHOZABURO SUGIMURA, SHIN HANREI TO GYOSEI HO NO SHO MONDAI [New 
Cases and Various Questions on Administrative Law] 14–18 (1943) (discussing the 
standard to be applied in distinguishing the valid administrative dispositions and the void 
ones). 
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requirement can be regarded as one of the 
requirements for administrative procedure.205 
Nevertheless, the commentators who located Udono in the 
context of administrative procedure did not precisely articulate 
which of the principles in administrative procedure was in question.  
They vaguely found the requirement of giving reasons to be one of 
the questions of administrative procedure.  This vague attitude gave 
rise to a couple of serious consequences.  One is that they did not 
pay attention to the level of formality of the administrative 
procedure in question.  They praised the private party’s protection 
even if the situation in question was a rather informal one as long as 
an administrative disposition was delivered.  The other is that most 
of them were not interested in the chance of the party concerned to 
convey his opinion to the administrative agency.206  In other words, 
most of them were concerned not with notice and hearing but with 
notice alone. 
The Supreme Court pushed its strict attitude toward the 
requirement of giving reasons still further in 1972.  In a case in 
which the Head of Tax Office claimed that the defect of an original 
assessment caused by the insufficient statement of reasons for the 
assessment had been cured by the meticulous reasons stated in the 
following decision of the administrative adjudication, the court 
denied the claim unanimously, holding thus:207 
Given the aforementioned purpose of the 
requirement of giving reasons in the assessments, it 
is not appropriate to admit curing of the defect in an 
assessment (disposition) delivered by an 
 
 205 Hiroshi Kaneko, Gyosei koi no kashi [Defects in Administrative Disposition], in 
GYOSEI HANREI HYAKUSEN 248, 249 (Enlarged ed., 1965). See also Hiroshi Shiono, Riyu no 
nai gyosei shobun wa nai [No Administrative Disposition without Reason], in GYOSEIHO 
WO MANABU [Learning Administrative Law] vol. 1 254, 257 (Hiroshi Shiono ed., 1978) 
(locating the requirement of giving reasons as one of the doctrines on administrative 
procedure); KANEKO, supra note 11, 21–24. 
 206 Cf. Kenzo Shiraishi, Zeimu sosho no tokushitsu [The Traits of Tax Litigation], 
7(12) ZEIRI 8 (1964) (arguing that the whole process of the communication between the tax 
officials and the taxpayer should be evaluated when the validity of a tax assessment is 
determined). 
 207 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 5, 1972, Sho 43 (gyō tsu) no. 61, 26 Saikō 
Saibansho minji hanreishū [Minshū] 1795 (Japan) (Oita zeimusho cho [Head of Oita Tax 
Office] v. Yamatoyo shoken kabushiki gaisha [Yamatoyo Securities, Co. Ltd.]). 
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administrative agency through an act by another 
agency.  For one thing, such a rule would be at odd 
with the purpose of the requirement, that is to make 
sure the first agency delivers the assessment with 
care and reasonableness.  For another, under such a 
rule, the taxpayer in question would not be able to 
claim the grounds for his dissatisfaction with the 
assessment fully before he knows the concrete 
reasons of the assessment through the administrative 
adjudication.208 
Therefore, the Supreme Court of Japan confirmed and 
strengthened the common law doctrine as established in Udono.  
According to the doctrine, an assessment of deficiency will be 
revoked as long as sufficient reasons are not given in the letter 
notifying the taxpayer of the assessment, even if the taxpayer is 
notified of the full reasons at a later date in the same administrative 
procedure. 
In 1985, the Supreme Court admitted clearly that the 
common law doctrine Udono established for the blue returns was 
applicable to administrative dispositions in general, although the 
extent of reasons required would differ on a case-by-case basis.209  
In the First-Class Architect decision, it held Udono intact even after 
the enactment of the APA.210  However, what the Court demanded 
in First-Class Architect was not to point out the facts found by the 
administrative agency, but to disclose the standards that the agency 
has established internally.211  In other words, despite its apparent 
concurrence with the traditional common law doctrine, First-Class 
Architect may have considerably extended or changed its meaning. 
In its revision of the tax acts in 2011, the Diet made Articles 
8 and 14 of the APA, the provisions stipulating the requirement of 
giving reasons, applicable to assessments of deficiency and initial 
assessments [kettei].  Therefore, now the Head of Tax Office must 
give reasons to all taxpayers, both blue return and non-blue return 
 
 208 Id. at 1798. 
 209 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 22, 1985, Sho 57 (gyō tsu) no. 70, 39 SAIKŌ 
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1, 3–4 (Japan). 
 210 First-Class Architect Case, supra note 22, at 2094. See also text accompanying 
supra notes 19–22. 
 211 First-Class Architect Case, supra note 22, at 2094–95. 
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filers.  As of 2019, neither the National Tax Agency nor 
commentators have found any theoretical principles explaining the 
different levels of giving reasons for each group of taxpayers.212 
C. Uniqueness of the Doctrine 
The common law doctrine on giving reasons in Japan is 
exceptional compared with the practices of other countries.  Given 
the profound consequences that an assessment has on the taxpayer, 
the attitude toward the requirement of giving reasons is somewhat 
understandable.213  However, it is undeniable that the doctrine has 
no counterparts in other countries.214 
In the United Kingdom, they have a similar case law 
doctrine on giving reasons, but the doctrine is applied on a case-by-
case basis and the penalty for the failure to give reasons is relatively 
light.215 
In the U.S., the APA does stipulate a strict rule for giving 
reasons that is applicable only to determinations made through 
formal adjudication.  In other words, the requirement for giving 
reasons is relevant only if a procedure in question is substantially 
similar to a judicial one in which the notification of the reasons for 
the tribunal’s judgment is essential.  The requirement is also applied 
when the administrative process in question is of rulemaking.  As a 
result, when the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service 
sends a notice of deficiency to a taxpayer, the Commissioner has to 
state the reasons for the determination of the tax he owes, but his 
failure to do so does not make the notice of deficiency invalid or 
 
 212 See Hideaki Sato, Gyosei tetsuzuki ho ni yori kazei shobun ni motomerareru riyu 
fuki no teido [The Extent of Reasons Required by the APA], 144 ZEIMU JIREI KENKYU 19 
(2015) (introducing the amendment to the APA in 2011 and providing an overview of the 
related lower court cases). 
 213 See text accompanying supra note 172. 
 214 See generally Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 633–659 
(1995) (discussing the meaning of giving reasons in general and the logic of giving 
reasons). Jerry L. Mashaw, Reasoned Administration: The European Union, the United 
States, and the Project of Democratic Governance, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 99, 99–101 
(2007) (a comparative legal analysis of the idea of giving reasons, including similarities 
between conceptions of “good administration” in the United States and in the European 
Union). Professor Mashaw’s interest lies not in whether the statement of the reasons exists, 
but in whether the alleged reasons are in fact reasonable. See Jerry Mashaw, The Rise of 
Reason Giving in American Administrative Law, in COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
268 (Susan Rose-Ackerman, Peter L. Lindseth, & Blake Emerson eds., 2nd ed. 2017). 
 215 See, e.g., TIMOTHY ENDICOTT, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 199–229 (4th ed. 2018). 
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revocable. 216   The reason for this treatment is that the 
Commissioner’s determination before the notice of deficiency is an 
informal adjudication at best.  Even in the context of the APA, the 
courts usually do not invalidate administrative decision-making just 
because there are defects in the procedure.  The harmless error 
doctrine embodied in Section 706 of the APA prevents 
administrative adjudications with small errors from being 
revoked.217 
The situation is almost the same in civil law countries such 
as Germany and France.  In Germany, they recognize “procedural 
errors” in administrative decisions. 218   However, the procedural 
errors rarely render the decisions void or revocable.  Article 45 of 
the German APA stipulates that the errors are curable during the 
procedure that follows.219  Article 46 of the German APA provides 
that harmless errors are ignored.220   In France, the treatment of 
procedural errors is almost the same as that in the U.S., the UK, and 
Germany.221 
In sum, Japan is the only jurisdiction that makes harsh 
demands of administrative agencies to give reasons whenever they 
make an administrative decision with an external effect.  The 
common law doctrine on giving reasons is far more peculiar when 
we consider that in Japan the protection of citizen’s procedural 
rights is relatively limited.222 
 
 216 See generally I.R.C. § 7522(a), supra note 16. 
 217 See, e.g., Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396 (2009). 
 218 Hermann Pünder, German Administrative Procedure in a Comparative Perspective: 
Observations on the Path to a Transnational Ius Commune Proceduralis, 11 INT’L J. 
CONST. L. 940, 953–55 (2013) (a comparative study of the question as to which 
consequences ought to be imposed upon procedural errors in Germany and in the United 
States). In Germany, a decision of the administration is considered to be an “administrative 
act,” which is a concept equivalent to an administrative disposition in Japan. See HERMANN 
PÜNDER & ANIKA KLAFKI, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN GERMANY, in COMPARATIVE 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, ITS MEMBER 
STATES AND THE UNITED STATES, 49, 52 (René Seerden, ed., 4th ed. 2018). 
 219 Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz (VwVfG) § 45, https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/vwvfg/__45.html [https://perma.cc/6PDJ-ZKEE). See PÜNDER, supra note 218, 
at 953. 
 220 Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz (VwVfG) § 46, https://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/vwvfg/__46.html [https://perma.cc/TU37-QBCY). See PÜNDER, supra note 218, 
at 953. 
 221 Id. at 957–58. 
 222 See generally articles cited in supra note 19. 
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D. An Analysis 
Japanese people did not understand Surrey’s original ideas.  
The Diet did not give tax officials sufficient power to collect 
information from taxpayers.  Even today, all tax officials can do is 
to resort to the power of investigation backed by very weak 
penalties for denying the investigation.223  Courts put the burden of 
proof in tax cases on the tax office or the government.224  The courts 
have traditionally considered a taxpayer’s tax liability in a given 
year, rather than a legal evaluation of one of the foundations for 
such liability as the object of tax dispute.  In other words, the scope 
of the judicial review of tax disputes is not limited.  Under these 
conditions, it is impossible to realize Surrey’s idea because 
taxpayers have lesser incentive to produce information than Surrey 
originally hoped for. 
Yet, a question remains.  Why did the Japanese people, both 
courts and commentators, stick to a literal and harsh enforcement of 
the giving reasons requirement in the Blue Return System?  One 
possible, and most natural, answer is that they were influenced by 
the jurisprudence of procedural due process in the U.S.225  Although 
Article 31 of the Constitution of Japan is applicable only to criminal 
procedures, some commentators have argued that it is also 
applicable to administrative procedures.226   However, it was not 
until 1992 when the Supreme Court first held that the article might 
be applicable to administrative procedures under certain 
 
 223 See, e.g., Kokuzei tsūsoku hō [Act on General Rules for National Taxes], Law No. 
66 of 1962, art. 74–2 (Japan) (authorizing tax officials for income tax investigation) and art. 
128, nos. 2 & 3 (Japan) (stating penalty of imprisonment for one year or less, or fine of 
500,000 yen or less for not cooperating with the investigation provided in art. 74(2), etc.). 
 224 SAIKO SAIBANSHO JIMU SOKYOKU [Supreme Court General Secretariat], 11 GYOSEI 
SAIBAN SHIRYO 49–52 (1950) (Japan) (Kunio Yano claimed the burden of proof in tax cases 
was on the defendant. Yano, then a member of the general secretariat of the Supreme Court, 
was in charge of administrative litigation). Cf. text accompanying supra note 84. 
 225 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 226 Nakamura v. Murakami (Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 28, 1962, Sho 30 (a) no. 
2961, 16 SaikŌ Saibansho Keiji HanreishŪ [KeishŪ] (1593) (Japan) is an important 
decision of the Supreme Court on the article handed down almost the same time as Udono. 
In Nakamura, the Court held that forfeiture of a third party’s belongings without notice and 
hearing to him violates article 31 of the Constitution and it invalidated the forfeiture. For 
English translation of Nakamura, see http://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=19 
[https://perma.cc/C5NA-T52L]. 
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conditions. 227   Besides, it has been agreed that administrative 
procedure attracted little interest in Japan until the 1970s.228  The 
level of safeguards that the procedural due process clause provides 
to taxpayers is not high.229 Thus, it would be difficult to see a direct 
link between the due process clause under the Constitution of the 
United States and the discourse on giving reasons in Japan. 
My hypothesis on the above question is that Japanese courts 
and commentators took a rigid attitude toward giving reasons 
because of three factors which are presented below.  American law 
influenced the first two factors, while the third is peculiar to Japan. 
First, several provisions of the Constitution and general 
principles of administrative procedure were collectively recognized 
as measures to protect citizens’ procedural rights in Japan.  A 
similar phenomenon was found in the US in the Lochner era.  For 
example, in Boyd v. United States, 230  the US Supreme Court 
combined the Fourth Amendment rule against unreasonable seizure 
with the self-incrimination clause under the Fifth Amendment.231  
Although recognizing various provisions and principles as a group 
does not necessarily mean failure to see the distinctiveness of each, 
it may make it easier to apply an element of a provision to another 
provision’s context.232 
Second, the exclusionary rule, or the rule of sacrificing a 
substantively correct judgment in the present in favor of deterring 
unfavorable actions by officials in the future233 had a great impact 
 
 227 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 1, 1992, Sho 61 (gyō tsu) no. 11, 46 SaikŌ 
Saibansho Minji HanreishŪ [MinshŪ] 437 (Japan). See also KATSUMI CHIBA, HEISEI 4 
(1992) NENDO SAIKO SAIBANSHO HANREI KAISETSU MINJI HEN [SUPREME COURT CASE 
COMMENTARY CIVIL EDITION (1992)] (Hosokai ed., 1995) 220, 246–57 (Japan); SHIGENORI 
MATSUI, THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 112–13 (2011). 
 228 Yasuhiro Okudaira, Forty Years of the Constitution and Its Various Influences: 
Japanese, American, and European, 53 L. CONTEMP. PROBS. 17, 31–32 (1990). 
 229 Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908). 
 230 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886). 
 231 See Akhil Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 787–
91 (1994) (a critical analysis that there is a better way to think about the Fourth 
Amendment by returning to its first principles). 
 232 But see Richard M. Re, The Due Process Exclusionary Rule, 127 HARV. L. REV. 
1885, 1907–28 (2014) (arguing that the exclusionary rule has its roots in the interaction 
between the Fourth Amendment and the Due Process Clauses). 
 233 They are often called “prophylactic” rules. See Evan H. Caminker, Miranda and 
Some Puzzles of “Prophylactic” Rules, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 11, 30 (2001) (defending the 
legitimacy of prophylactic doctrinal rules in constitutional law). 
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on Japanese lawyers.234  They must have found the idea of securing 
the integrity of the legal process by giving up a benefit in the near 
future to be enlightening, and very “American,” and therefore quite 
attractive. The Supreme Court applied the exclusionary rule in the 
context of criminal procedure for the first time in 1978.235  However, 
six out of the fifteen Justices of the Court insisted on the adoption of 
the rule as early as in 1961.236 
Third, the failure of the Japanese to follow Surrey’s advice is 
partly accredited to the different lines drawn between civil and 
criminal laws in Japan and in the U.S.  Japanese scholars and 
practitioners had relatively easily drawn an analogy with criminal 
law in understanding administrative law, especially when an 
administrative act may bring about a seemingly adverse impact on 
the citizens.  The concept of an “adverse impact” is broad enough to 
include acts such as the ascertainment of tax liability.  It appears 
that they have deemed administrative law to effectively be a branch 
of criminal law.237  In the U.S., there is also a distinction between 
civil and criminal laws. Administrative law is definitely a branch of 
civil law.  Even though the distinctions between a regulation, a 
typical administrative action, and a punishment are sometimes 
 
 234 See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236–39 (2011) (indicating the 
deterrence of future Fourth Amendment violations is the sole purpose of the exclusionary 
rule). 
 235 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 7, 1978, Sho 51 (a) no. 865, 32 SaikŌ Saibansho 
Keiji HanreishŪ [KeishŪ] 1672 (Japan). 
 236 Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 7, 1961, Sho 31 (a) no. 2863, 15 SaikŌ Saibansho 
Keiji HanreishŪ [KeishŪ] 915 (Japan). As the law clerk’s report on the decision pointed out, 
two of the Justices (Katsushige Kotani and Daisuke Kawamura) insisted on exclusion of 
illegally acquired materials without exception, an idea more radical than that of the 
Supreme Court of the United States at that time. TADASHI KURITA, SHOWA 36 (1961) 
NENDO SAIKO SAIBANSHO HANREI KAISETSU KEIJI HEN [SUPREME COURT CASE COMMENTARY 
CRIMINAL EDITION (1961)] (Hosokai ed., 1973) 141, 147. 
 237 It is not easy to discern where this idea came from. In the workshop held at Harvard 
Law School on September 29, 2018, Professor Mark Levin indicated the influence of the 
Chinese tradition. See HALEY, supra note 1, at 19–32; MARK LEVIN, Continuities of Legal 
Consciousness: Professor John Haley’s Writings on Twelve Hundred Years of Japanese 
Legal History, 8 Wash. Univ. Global Stud. L. Rev. 317 (2009). It might be accredited to 
the tradition of German law, in which the conceptual framework of criminal law was 
employed in the scholarly investigations in the substantive tax law. See generally ALBERT 
HENSEL, STEUERRECHT (3rd ed. 1933) (providing a systematic discussion of tax law partly 
based on criminal law in Germany); SHOZABURO SUGIMURA, DOITSU SOZEI HO RON 
[GERMAN TAX LAW] (1931) (translating the second edition of the Hensel’s textbook on tax 
law). 
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blurred,238 there are many administrative actions that are far from 
the punishment of criminals, such as the ascertainment of tax 
liability of a taxpayer for a given year.  American lawyers would not 
consider issuing a notice of deficiency to a taxpayer to be analogous 
with his prosecution. 
In sum, the strict attitude of the Supreme Court of Japan 
toward the requirement of giving reasons might be ascribed to three 
factors: understanding procedural provisions as a whole; influence 
of the exclusionary rule; and the adverse impacts of administrative 
actions associated with criminal punishment. 
V. CONCLUSION 
In this article, I have argued the following two points.  First, 
I have shown that Stanley Surrey wrote a part of the Report of the 
Shoup Mission based on articles he published during the project he 
had carried out with Roger Traynor.  Second, I have described how 
Surrey’s original idea was interpreted in a totally different context 
and how it gave birth to a sui generis doctrine on giving reasons in 
administrative procedures. 
Although the Japanese experience is unique, we can learn 
important lessons from it.  Recently, several tax law scholars began 
to criticize “tax exceptionalism,” an implicit notion that the general 
principles of administrative law are not necessarily applied to tax 
cases.239  In Mayo, the Supreme Court took up the invitation to 
abandon the tax exceptionalism in the context of the Chevron 
deference.240  However, the courts are, entirely reasonably, reluctant 
to extend the reasoned explanation doctrine to the notice of 
deficiency.241   Against this backdrop, it may be argued that the 
process of determining the tax liability of a taxpayer is entirely 
different from the traditional administrative process in which an 
 
 238 See generally Paul H. Robinson, The Criminal-Civil Distinction and the Utility of 
Desert, 76 BU L. Rev. 201, 202–05 (1996) (providing an overview of explanations 
academics offer of the distinction); AUSTIN SARAT ET AL., LAW AS PUNISHMENT / LAW AS 
REGULATION (2011). 
 239 See, e.g., Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don’t Let Your Babies Grow Up 
to Be Tax Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517, 531 (1994); Kristin Hickman, The Need for 
Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV.1537, 1618 
(2006). 
 240 Mayo Foundation v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 46 (2011). 
 241 See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
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administrative agency tries to realize its policy goals through 
command and control over the regulated parties.242  In determining 
the tax liability, a taxpayer and the tax officials do cooperate with 
each other.  A taxpayer discloses the factual information that is 
necessary in determining her tax liability in a given year to the tax 
officials.  The tax officials then offer her the necessary legal 
information through statutes, regulations, letter rulings, and so on.  
Thus, the process of the determination of tax liability has embodied 
a collaborative relationship between the citizen and the 
administrative agency.  The process of determining tax liability is 
best conceived as an example of the “third generation of 
administrative procedure.”243  The Japanese experience reinforces 
the idea by clarifying the problem of considering the process of 
determining the tax liability in the context of the traditional 
command-and-control model of administrative procedure. 
 
 
 242 See Javier Barnes, Towards a Third Generation of Administrative Procedure, in 
COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 336, 344–45 (Susan Rose-Ackerman & Peter L. 
Lindseth eds., 2011) (describing the traditional administrative procedure). 
 243 Id. See also JAVIER BARNES, Three Generations of Administrative Procedures, in 
COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 302 (Susan Rose-Ackerman, Peter L. Lindseth, & 
Blake Emerson, 2nd ed. 2017) (explaining the “third generation of administrative 
procedure” expression). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/alr/vol15/iss2/1
